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Deputizing Family: Loved Ones as a Regulatory Tool in the 
“Drug War” and Beyond
Matthew B. Lawrence*1
Many laws use family members as a regulatory tool to influence the 
decisions or behavior of their loved ones, i.e., they deputize family. Involuntary 
treatment laws for substance use disorder are a clear example; such laws 
empower family members to use information shared by their loved ones to 
petition to force their loved ones into treatment without consent. Whether 
such deputization is helpful or harmful for a patient’s health is a crucial and 
dubious question discussed in existing literature, but use of family members as 
a regulatory tool implicates important considerations beyond direct medical 
impacts that have not been as fully explored. These include the potential for 
interference with underlying family relationships, the invisibility of care 
worker burdens, and the inequality of both the burdens and the benefits of care 
work. 
This Article shows how these difficult-to-quantify social consequences 
of deputizing family can and should be incorporated into the evaluation of 
laws that use loved ones as a tool of public health. It develops a normative 
framework for doing so and demonstrates the usefulness of this framework 
by applying it to the question of how and when patients may permit family 
members to access and authorize disclosures of protected health information. 
That analysis reveals the desirability of an “active choice” approach to such 
deputization; as compared to an “isolation by default” approach, active choice 
holds the promise to better and more fairly encourage, recognize, support, 
facilitate, and perhaps even compensate the uniquely valuable care work by 
loved ones that many who suffer from substance use disorder rely upon as a 
crucial support in their battle with illness. Specific administrative changes to 
effectuate that conclusion are recommended.  Finally, the broader promise and 
pitfalls of the Article’s “deputization” frame for understanding certain forms 
of care work are also discussed.
*1 Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson Law.
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University School of Law’s 2018 annual conference, “Diseases of Despair: The 
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I. Introduction
The United States regulatory framework for preventing, 
treating, and reducing the harms of substance use disorder (“SUD”) 
increasingly relies upon loved ones of those who suffer from the 
disease. In some cases the law explicitly and intentionally deputizes 
family in addressing SUD; for example, “accessory” drug laws enlist 
family in efforts at prevention-by-prohibition by making them liable 
for involvement in their loved ones’ drug use.1 And involuntary 
treatment laws enacted by numerous states and under consideration 
in many others explicitly empower a person’s “physician, spouse, 
blood relative, [or] guardian” to petition a court to have them sent 
to treatment.2 
In other cases, the SUD regulatory framework deputizes 
family implicitly and perhaps unintentionally, though nonetheless 
foreseeably. In many counties and states today, accessing treatment 
for SUD entails days or weeks of phone calls and car trips looking 
for open beds, especially for those hoping to have treatment covered 
by insurance or Medicaid. In economics and ethics, this is referred 
to as rationing by “ordeal”—rather than prices separating those 
who receive the good from those who do not, a person’s ability to 
complete an arduous task does so.3 When it comes to addiction, 
the ordeal our regulatory framework puts between self-diagnosis of 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding 
conviction based on inference that one who owns and maintains a house knows 
about drug and other illegal activities her son and other occupants engage in 
inside the home); United States v. Johnson, 769 F. Supp. 389, 394 (D.D.C. 
1991) (holding that “Johnson’s status as the lessee alone is a sufficient basis 
upon which to find Ms. Johnson guilty of possession with intent to distribute” 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (2018)).
2 E.g., S. 391, Gen. Assemb., 2017−18 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017) (“A spouse, relative 
or guardian of the respondent must file the [involuntary treatment] petition.”). 
See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, § 35 (2018) (showing that a proceeding 
may be initiated by a “police officer, physician, spouse, blood relative, 
guardian, or court official”). See generally Involuntary Commitment for Individuals 
with a Substance Use Disorder or Alcoholism, Nat’l Alliance for Model 




3 See Benjamin A. Olken, Hassles Versus Prices: How Can Subsidized Health Products 
Best Target Those Who Value Them?, 353 Science 864 (2016). See generally Vivi 
Alatas et al., Ordeal Mechanisms in Targeting: Theory and Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Indonesia (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 
No. 19127, 2013).
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suspected SUD and life-saving treatment can effectively conscript 
involved loved ones in helping a person with SUD find and obtain 
care, unpaid. 
These are only examples. For many sufferers, loved ones play 
a vital and often personally costly role in almost every aspect of their 
battle with SUD. Families devote countless hours to reducing the 
harms of illness, accessing and navigating treatment, and assisting 
their loved ones in their recovery. They provide support, shelter, 
food, counseling, oversight, transportation, encouragement, love, 
advocacy, and care, among other things.4 
Scholarship addressing specifically the role of family in 
fighting disease, including SUD, has appropriately focused on the 
crucial and pressing question of whether family involvement helps 
or hurts patients’ (or, sometimes, caregivers’) health outcomes 
(meta-analyses of existing studies report that social relationships 
significantly improve health outcomes on net),5 with some 
exceptions.6 On this frame, whether deputization is a good idea or 
not depends exclusively on whether it improves the health of those 
directly impacted or not. This Article shows how our understanding 
of the wisdom vel non of laws that deputize family members can 
4 See generally Beverly Conyers, Addict in the Family: Stories of 
Loss, Hope, and Recovery (2003); Bonnie Kaye, Jennifer Needle 
in Her Arm: Healing from the Hell of my Daughter’s Drug 
Overdose (2014); Chloe Silverman, Understanding Autism: 
Parents, Doctors, and the History of a Disorder 235−36 (2012).
5 See Julianne Holt-Lunstad et al., Social Relationships and Mortality Risk: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 7 Pub. Libr. of Sci. 9 (2010) (discussing that, in a meta-
analysis of 148 independent studies, social relationships (including living 
alone, marital status, perceptions of loneliness, and so on) were found to 
“significantly predict mortality” with an overall effect corresponding to “a 
50% increase in odds of survival as a function of social relationships”); J. S. 
House et al., Social Relationships and Health, 241 Science 540, 541 (1988) 
(“Social relationships, or the relative lack thereof, constitute a major risk 
factor for health—rivaling the effect of well-established health risk factors 
such as cigarette smoking, blood pressure, blood lipids, obesity and physical 
activity . . . .”); Candyce H. Kroenke et al., Social Networks, Social Support, and 
Survival After Breast Cancer Diagnosis, 24 J. Clinical Oncology 1105 (2006)
(66% increased mortality among breast cancer patients who were socially 
isolated, i.e., reported not having a “confidant”).
6 See Allison K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 Yale J. 
Health Pol’y, L. & Ethics 147 (2016) (addressing care work burdens 
on family in the context of long-term care). This Article seeks to build on 
Hoffman’s study of long-term care by applying the focus on family care takers 
to SUD, elaborating upon impacts care work has, and developing a welfare 
economic framework to balance social consequences with health impacts.
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be improved by broadening our perspective to encompass not only 
medical effects but also social consequences for patients and their 
families. 
Specifically, this Article draws from a line of feminist legal 
scholarship problematizing “care work” in other contexts—in 
particular childcare and long-term care—to identify considerations 
other than health impacts that can affect the desirability of 
deputizing family. These include the potential for interference 
with existing family relationships, invisibility of the burden of care 
work on loved ones, and inequality in the distribution of burdens 
and benefits of care work. The Article then explores the real-world 
implications of such difficult-to-quantify considerations, arguing 
that their existence necessitates more cautious, research-informed 
regulation; drawing from literature on cost-benefit analysis to offer a 
normative framework for the weighing of such considerations given 
incomplete evidence; and demonstrating the usefulness of that 
framework by applying it to lay out the case for adopting an “active 
choice” approach to deputizing family to obtain and share private 
information about SUD treatment. 
In short, the Article illustrates through its study of SUD 
how assessment of laws that deputize family in health care can be 
improved by considering the interference with family relationships, 
invisible burdens, and inequality entailed in some such laws. The 
Article then touches upon implications for deputizing family and the 
development of family law beyond health care.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II offers background 
and motivation. It shows how the addictions crisis and associated 
“drug war” is a ready topic through which to explore laws that 
deputize family because laws in this domain increasingly use family 
as a regulatory tool and because family are a particularly potent tool 
for diseases of despair such as addiction. 
Part III draws from existing scholarship on care work in 
other contexts to develop consequential normative considerations 
for assessing laws that deputize family that include considerations 
beyond direct health impacts. It argues that while health impacts are 
of course a primary consequential concern, when weighing laws that 
deputize family we must also consider the potential for interference 
with family relationships, and the potential invisibility of care work, 
the potential inequality of care work. 
Part IV explores implications. In light of the behavioral 
“knowledge problem,” it may be difficult to know for sure whether 
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social consequences like those identified in Part III outweigh potential 
health impacts to counsel against (or in favor of) any particular 
reform. As a first step, new laws deputizing family should include 
information-gathering provisions to enable ongoing assessment 
of any social and health impacts that might support subsequent 
revision, and policymakers should be hesitant to adopt reforms 
that may interfere with family relationships without an evidentiary 
basis for believing that such interference is medically justified. 
Furthermore, “break-even” analysis employed to incorporate hard-
to-quantify variables into cost-benefit analysis in administrative law 
and regulation can be used to account for social consequences. Part 
IV shows how employing this approach supports a change to the 
choice architecture of consent to disclosure of protected SUD health 
information; patients should be given an “active choice” about 
whether they consent to disclosure of their information to loved 
ones. As compared to an “opt in” approach that favors isolation by 
default, such an active choosing regime recognizes and encourages 
underlying family relationships, brings family burdens to light, and 
mitigates inequality in access to and burdens of family support. 
Finally, the conclusion summarizes and discusses implications 
beyond substance use disorder and beyond health care. While the 
Article’s launching-off point and focus is the increasing deputization 
of family in the “drug war,” its narrative framework and discussion 
offer broader insights. Its normative approach is broadly applicable, 
though additional variables for break-even analysis will depend on 
context. More fundamentally, the “deputizing” frame that emerges 
from a focus on the utilization of family as a regulatory tool in 
public health helpfully collapses the public/private distinction that 
has contributed to invisibility of care work in other contexts, but 
problematically may do so by bringing all family life into the “public” 
sphere. 
II. Loved Ones as a Regulatory Tool in Public Health: the Case of 
SUD 
A. Leverage Points for Regulating SUD
Health law scholarship traditionally separated, for purposes 
of analysis, laws’ impacts on health care cost, access, and quality 
(in addition to ethical considerations).7 Scholarship in public health 
7 E.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law, 41 Wake 
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in recent years has shown us that we must consider also the social 
determinants of health and the impact of health laws on harm 
reduction.8 Thus, analyzing the consequences of law for health or 
a disease requires at least considering a law’s impacts on social 
determinants, harm reduction, access to health care, quality of care, 
and cost. 
In addressing SUD as with other chronic illnesses, this 
framework for understanding a law’s potential impacts on health 
maps roughly onto four key leverage points at which laws seek to or 
foreseeably change behavior and outcomes. These leverage points 
are prevention, harm reduction, access, and quality.9 
First, prevention. The likelihood of contracting addiction in 
the first place, which might be thought of as a person’s baseline 
“health,” is a function not only of their vital characteristics but also 
of their behaviors, access to transportation, housing, and other 
social determinants. One engrained legal effort at reducing the risk 
of addiction is criminal prohibition on drug use and sale associated 
Forest L. Rev. 365, 379 (2006) (describing textbook separation of cost, 
access, and quality, as well as ethics or autonomy, as considerations in health 
law). 
8 See generally Nancy E. Adler et al., Addressing Social Determinants of Health and 
Health Inequalities, 316 JAMA 1641 (2016); Mary C. Brucker, Social Determinants 
of Health, Nursing for Women’s Health 7 (2017); Victor R. Fuchs, 
Social Determinants of Health: Caveats and Nuances, 317 JAMA 25 (2017). Harm 
reduction can be conceptualized within “quality,” and is included under the 
umbrella of “health impacts” in the framework I utilize below. However, it 
is valuable to recognize the distinct importance of harm reduction because 
“quality” in this context can too easily be assumed to mean “quality of medical 
care,” i.e., to refer only to the treatment received from the provider itself.
9 Analyzing the legal framework for regulating any chronic illness by addressing 
impacts on risk of disease, the harms of disease, access to treatment, and 
quality of treatment does not track perfectly with the underlying health 
concerns of social determinants, harm reduction, access, quality, and cost. 
Social determinants of health impact every leverage point, from contraction 
of disease to quality of treatment. And “cost” is not a single decision-making 
or leverage point, but rather a consideration distinct from health that must 
be accounted for in evaluating the effectiveness of a legal intervention 
at any such point. Under conditions of scarcity, where funds are finite, it 
is particularly important to consider cost as a “pro” or “con” of any given 
regulatory approach, in addition to other considerations discussed below 
including health impacts and social consequences. In such a case, “cost” in 
dollars can be roughly translated into “opportunity cost” in terms of foregone 
alternative policies or efforts. See Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84 
Fordham L. Rev. 79, 99 (2015) (discussing this state of affairs). 
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with the “drug war,”10 but housing policy, early intervention efforts, 
medical prescribing and reimbursement policy, and insurance 
coverage should not be overlooked as they play a significant role.11 
For example, it is now well understood that a legal framework that 
makes it more profitable for providers to treat apparent pain with a 
simple opioid prescription than with more time-intensive approaches 
contributes significantly to the spread of addiction.12
Second, harm reduction is an additional point of leverage at 
which laws influence behavior to impact SUD outcomes. Some laws 
seek to reduce the risk of fatal overdose, infection, or other harms 
associated with addiction. Laws facilitating naloxone distribution 
are a positive example of such harm reduction;13 by making it more 
likely bystanders or first responders have access to this overdose-
reversing drug, such laws reduce the likelihood that an overdose 
is deadly. But other laws arguably exacerbate the harms associated 
with addiction. Prohibitions on drug use may push sufferers to use 
in secret and unsafe environments, increasing the risk of infection or 
10 See Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2173, 2174 nn. 3–4 
(2015) (collecting sources problematizing the “war on drugs”). 
11 See generally Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 261 (2010) (comparing 
both historical and recent drug policies between the United States and 
Britain); Sara Gordon, The Use and Abuse of Mutual-Support Programs in Drug 
Courts, U. Ill. L. Rev. 1503 (2017) (highlighting drug courts as an important 
but incomplete tool in drug addiction efforts); Laurie C. Malkin, Comment, 
Troubles at the Doorstep: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Group Homes 
for Recovering Substance Abusers, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 757 (1995) (encouraging 
group homes for recovering substance addicts despite community opposition); 
Ellen Weber, Equality Standards For Health Insurance Coverage: Will the Mental 
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimination?, 43 Golden 
Gate U. L. Rev. 179 (2013) (explaining the prohibition of discriminatory 
health insurance coverage for persons with mental health and substance use 
disorders in large employer health plans).
12 E.g., Beth Han et al., Prescription Opioid Use, Misuse, and Use Disorders in U.S. 
Adults: 2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, Annals of Internal 
Med. (2017), https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/2300/2017/
AnnalsInternalMed.pdf (discussing role of prescription opioid availability and 
misuse); Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Amid Opioid Crisis, Insurers Restrict 
Pricey, Less Addictive Painkiller, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/09/17/health/opioid-painkillers-insurance-companies.
html (“Opioid drugs are generally cheap while safer alternatives are often more 
expensive . . . doctors are given incentives to use less expensive treatments 
that provide fast relief.”).
13 Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs, 50 State Review on Opioid Related 
Policy 26−29 (2017) (providing overview of such laws).
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unsupervised overdose.14 
Third, laws impact access to care. Access to treatment for SUD 
depends on the interaction of a person seeking treatment, having a 
way to pay for that treatment, and finding a provider available. As 
an illustration, Medicaid reimbursement rates and conditions for 
inpatient treatment have an obvious impact on the availability of 
providers and, so, access to such treatment.15
Fourth, laws impact behavior and outcomes by influencing 
the quality of treatment. This, in turn, influences the likelihood and 
length of recovery for one who is able to access treatment. Laws 
directly limiting or encouraging Medication Assisted Treatment 
(“MAT”) have an impact on quality, because studies show MAT has 
positive outcomes relative to other forms of treatment.16 Other laws 
play a more subtle role. Current regulatory guidance interpreting the 
Anti-Kickback Statute makes it difficult (though not impossible) for 
providers to offer free transportation to get patients to treatment.17 
Yet transportation is a factor in adherence to treatment and so 
quality.18
14 Cf. Leo Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Facilities in the United 
States, 98 Am. J. Pub. Health 231, 232 (2008) (“In multivariate analyses of 
an IDU cohort in Vancouver, S[afe ]I[njection ]F[acilities] use was negatively 
associated with needle sharing . . . and positively associated with less frequent 
reuse of syringes . . . .”). 
15 See Note, Congressional Intent to Preclude Equitable Relief – Ex Parte Young After 
Armstrong, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 828, 832 (2018) (“The significance of the 
Armstrong Court’s holding for the Medicaid providers seeking to enforce 
the Medicaid Act was clear: their claims could not move forward”); Peter 
Cunningham & Ann O’Malley, Do Reimbursement Delays Discourage Medicaid 
Participation By Physicians?, Health Aff.: Health Aff. Blog (Jan. 1, 2009), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.28.1.w17#R3 (“Low 
Medicaid reimbursement rates relative to those of Medicare and private payers 
are usually considered to be the primary reason for low physician participation 
in Medicaid.”).
16 See W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., No. 11-W-00307/3, 
West Virginia Continuum of Care for Medicaid Enrollees with 
Substance Use Disorders 7 tbl.1 (2017) (Sec. 1115 Waiver to expand 
Medicaid reimbursement to IMD with fewer than 16 beds); Luis Sordo et al., 
Mortality Risk During and After Opioid Substitution Treatment: Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis of Cohort Studies, 357 BMJ 1, 12 (2017).
17 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(bb)(1)(i-v) (2018) (incorporating the language from: 
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the 
Safe Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 81 Fed. Reg. 88368 (Dec. 7, 
2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 1001 and 1003)).
18 See, e.g., Samina T. Syed et al., Traveling Towards Disease: Transportation Barriers to 
Health Care Access, 38 J. Community Health 976 (2013).
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B. Explicit Deputization
The United States public health regulatory framework for 
addressing the addictions crisis uses many traditional regulatory 
tools. These include information campaigns, prohibition of some 
substances and regulation of others in an effort to reduce consumption, 
and partially-subsidized health care for some sufferers.19 Increasingly, 
however, efforts to prevent, treat, and reduce the harms of drug 
addiction work through loved ones, explicitly using family members 
as a regulatory tool to influence the behavior of their loved ones. 20  
That is, the law deputizes family in achieving public health ends.21
19 See Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic 
Determinants, 108 Am. J. Public Health 182 (2018) (discussing aspects of 
framework); Fernando D. Simoes, Paternalism and Health Law: Legal Promotion 
of a Healthy Lifestyle, 4 Eur. J. Risk. Reg. 347, 356–65 (2013) (surveying 
and evaluating traditional tools of public health regulation in the context of 
tackling obesity).
20 This Article uses the definition of “family” articulated in SAMHSA’s family 
therapy treatment protocol: “While the definition of family may change 
according to different circumstances” it includes “traditional families,” 
“extended families,” and “elected families, which are self-identified and are 
joined by choice and not by the usual ties of blood, marriage, and law” such 
as godparents or close friends. In other words, “[f]or practical purposes, 
family can be defined according to the individual client’s closest emotional 
connections.” U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Treatment 
Improvement Protocol 39, Substance Abuse Treatment and 
Family Therapy, at xvi, 2 (2015). 
21 By “deputize” this Article means intentionally or foreseeably using a third 
party to influence a subject’s behavior. This may include laws that empower/
disempower third parties with formal legal responsibilities or obligations as 
well as laws that influence the incentives of third parties, encouraging them 
to intervene to alter others’ behavior. In seeking to capture pragmatically the 
breadth of situations in which the law utilizes third parties as a regulatory tool, 
this understanding is intentionally broader than the traditional understanding 
of a sheriff “deputizing” some locals when need/emergency pressed. Cf. 
Steven Lubet, The Forgotten Trial of Wyatt Earp, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 20 n.76 
(2001) (describing significance in trial of the fact that while Earp had formally 
deputized his brothers, Doc Holliday may not have actually been deputized 
“when he joined Virgil Earp’s posse”). Rather, its use of the term is closer to 
the use in federalism scholarship on federal laws that “deputize” states. E.g., 
David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: 
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement is Shared by the United States, the States, 
and Their Citizens?, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1552, 1571 (1995) (“As a result, essentially 
all the modern major environmental laws provide uniform, minimum national 
standards with the states ‘deputized,’ to a greater or lesser degree, to do the 
permitting and enforcing for the federal government.”). See generally Shirly 
Lin, Comment, States of Resistance: The Real ID Act and Constitutional Limits Upon 
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Prevention: Prohibition laws are a core, controversial aspect of 
current federal and state efforts to reduce the harms of SUD.22 Laws 
that forbid or restrict use or sale of certain addictive substances 
seek to prevent people from developing SUD by preventing misuse. 
But in some cases, such laws seek to enlist family in prevention-by-
prohibition by exposing them to liability for failing to intervene in 
and halt prohibited uses or sales in their home or presence. Drug 
possession laws and associated civil forfeiture penalties are an 
example, putting a person’s home at risk if she fails to halt certain 
drug activity engaged in by those staying with her, as a means to use 
the homeowner to seek to alter her co-occupants’ behavior.23 
Harm reduction: Efforts to reduce the harm of SUD, too, 
increasingly operate through loved ones. Naloxone is a life-saving 
drug that is relatively easy to administer and can prevent the death 
of a person who is overdosing from opioids. Understandably, 
increasing access to and utilization of Naloxone is a significant 
focus of regulators and reformers. One way this is done is by 
prescribing Naloxone prophylactically not only to those suffering 
from SUD but also likely bystanders to an overdose, including family 
members or friends. Hence the American Medical Association’s 
guidance encouraging providers to prescribe naloxone to “a family 
member or close friend” of SUD patients.24 Consistent with that 
recommendation, many states have standing orders that explicitly 
identify “family members” as eligible for third-party prescriptions 
of Naloxone.25 
Federal Deputization of State Agencies in the Regulation of Non-Citizens, 12 N.Y. 
City L. Rev. 329 (2009) (exploring the post-9/11 deputization of state and 
local authorities to investigate and detain undocumented immigrants). For 
reflections on the narrative implications of labeling even family members who 
the law foreseeably enlists in achieving government ends as “deputies,” see 
infra Part V.
22 See Levin, supra note 10 (collecting sources expressing skepticism about “war 
on drugs”).
23 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 5803 (West 2018); (discussing civil forfeiture penalty).
24 Am. Med. Ass’n Opioid Task Force, Help Save Lives: Co-Prescribe Naloxone to 
Patient’s at Risk of Overdose, End the Epidemic (2017), https://www.end-
opioid-epidemic.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/AMA-Opioid-Task-Force-
naloxone-one-pager-updated-August-2017-FINAL-1.pdf. 
25 E.g., Pa. Dep’t of Health, Standing Order DOH-002-2018, Naloxone 
Prescription for Overdose Prevention (2018). See generally Legal 
Science, Naloxone Overdose Prevention Laws, Prescription Drug Abuse 
Policy System (July 1, 2017), http://pdaps.org/datasets/laws-regulating-
administration-of-naloxone-1501695139 (providing a 50-state survey of 
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Treatment: One of several challenges to providing treatment 
to those suffering from SUD is that the nature of the illness, 
coupled with the stigma surrounding it, makes sufferers less likely 
to pursue treatment voluntarily.26 Involuntary treatment laws are 
a controversial attempt to address this challenge. Such laws create 
a mechanism through which SUD sufferers can be forced into 
treatment without their consent. For present purposes, it suffices 
to note that such laws often explicitly deputize family, limiting the 
class of persons eligible to initiate the involuntary treatment process 
to guardians and family members.27 
Quality: Finally, treatment protocols that call for incorporating 
family into the recovery process are an example of policies that seek 
to impact the quality of care through the behavior of family members. 
For example, the “Recovery Oriented Community” program calls 
upon family members to take a formal, active, and ongoing role 
in their loved one’s recovery,28 in recognition of years of research 
indicating that social relationships such as family involvement are 
a significant positive influence on recovery.29 Family members are 
actively incorporated in developing the treatment protocol and 
enrolled in a communication program through which they and 
Naloxone access laws). 
26 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052, 
6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (noting concern that 
“individuals with substance use disorders [fail to] seek needed treatment” due 
to concern about negative consequences of the disclosure of such treatment to 
employers, landlords, law enforcement, and others).
27 E.g., S.B. 391, Gen. Assemb., 2017−18 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017) (“A spouse, 
relative or guardian of the respondent must file the [involuntary treatment] 
petition.”). Indeed, such laws are occasionally referred to as “Casey’s Laws,” 
named after the first such law in Kentucky which was motivated in part by 
one family’s story of their son dying of a drug overdose after the legal system 
rebuffed the family’s efforts to force their son into involuntary treatment. For 
an example of the use of this term and discussion of the Kentucky law, see 
Bradley J. Steffen, Battling the Heroin Epidemic with Involuntary Treatment, 12 J. L. 
& Soc. Deviance 181, 204−13 (2016).
28 Lori Simons et al., A Promising Approach for Families of and Young Adults with 
Opioid-Related Disorders: The Recovery Oriented Community (ROC) Program, 2 J. 
Drug Abuse 1 (2016).
29 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of social 
relationships on recovery in other contexts); Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the 
Barriers: Public Health Strategies for Expanding Drug Treatment in Communities, 
57 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 653 n.79 (2005) (“Sustaining recovery is also 
more difficult for individuals who do not have access to . . . a family support 
system.”).
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medical providers maintain contact through telephone, text, online 
support, and weekly meetings.
C. Implicit Deputization
In many areas the deputization of family is implicit rather 
than explicit, though no less important. Family are on the front 
lines of each leverage point of SUD—prevention, harm reduction, 
treatment, and recovery, though their role as an aspect of our public 
health system is sometimes not appreciated.30 Family can discourage 
substance misuse, help to identify and encourage treatment for 
comorbidities of addiction such as mental illness, and help to 
identify and encourage early treatment of SUD, thereby reducing 
the risk and severity of addiction.31 
Moreover, for those who suffer from SUD, family can play 
a key role in harm reduction. Family may provide relatively safe 
housing and, often, a place to use drugs with some sort of supervision 
and help nearby.32 
Similarly, family can play a key role in facilitating access 
30 See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Facing Addiction in 
America: The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and 
Health 1-3 (2016) [hereinafter Surgeon General’s Report] (providing 
exhaustive list of “public, private, and voluntary entities that contribute to the 
delivery of essential public health services within a jurisdiction” and make up 
the “Public Health System” but not mentioning role of family in provision of 
such services); see also id. at 1-4 (same).
31 Jeffrey M. Jones, Poll: Only About Half of Addicted Family Members Sought Treatment, 
Gallup News Serv. (Aug. 18, 2006), http://news.gallup.com/poll/24196/
poll-only-about-half-addicted-family-members-sought-treatment.aspx 
(showing that pressure from family was among the most common factors in 
SUD patients’ decisions to seek treatment).
32 E.g., Sarah M. Bagley et al., Overdose Education and Naloxone Rescue Kits for 
Family Members of Individuals Who Use Opioids: Characteristics, Motivations, and 
Naloxone Use, 36 Substance Abuse 149, 151 tbl. 1 (reporting successful 
Massachusetts program to train family members in use of naloxone); 
Alexandra Rockey Fleming, For Families of Addicts, Narcan Has Truly Been a 
Lifesaving Drug, Wash. Post (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national/health-science/for-families-of-addicts-narcan-has-truly-been-
a-lifesaving-drug/2018/01/05/75ffb206-d469-11e7-b62d-d9345ced896d_
story.html?utm_term=.03703597a46d (telling story of mother who revived 
her 22-year-old son from an overdose in the home they shared using Narcan; 
he then entered an inpatient treatment program); Anna V. Williams et al., 
Training Family Members to Manage Heroin Overdose and Administer Naloxone: 
Randomized Trial of Effects on Knowledge and Attitudes, 109 Addiction 250 
(2013) (reporting positive educational outcomes from take-home naloxone 
administration training).
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to treatment for those with SUD. Family may press sufferers to 
seek treatment.33 They may help to arrange or apply for insurance 
coverage, or provide financial support where coverage is lacking.34 
They help to find available (and covered) treatment and get their 
loved ones into such treatment.35 
Finally, SUD patients often invite their family to play a key 
role in maintaining recovery from SUD as well. Recovery may be 
aided by not just traditional medical care but transportation (for 
possible probation check-ins, MAT, or work), housing, meaningful 
employment or other engagement, help navigating the criminal 
justice system, child care, and above all community. Whether 
motivated by love, altruism, or even filial support requirements, 
family provide all of these things.36
33 See W.R. Miller et al., Engaging the Unmotivated in Treatment for Alcohol Problems: 
A Comparison of Three Strategies for Intervention Through Family Members, 67 J. 
Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 688 (1999). Particularly for adolescents 
“family pressure may play an important role in getting adolescents to enter, 
stay in, and complete treatment.” Surgeon General’s Report, supra note 
30, at 4-14.
34 E.g., Liz Navratil, Tell Them My Story: Ross Woman’s Obituary Sheds Light on 
Addiction, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Jan. 22, 2017), http://www.post-
gazette.com/news/overdosed/2017/01/22/Tell-them-my-story-Maybe-
it-would-help-somebody-Ross-Pittsburgh-overdose-obituary-addiction/
stories/201701220121 (describing fatal overdose of young woman while she 
and her mother were working to find a treatment facility covered by their 
insurance after calendar-year change in insurance led to dropped coverage at 
originally-planned treatment center); Jeanne Whalen, After Addiction Comes 
Families’ Second Blow: The Crushing Cost of Rehab, Wall Street J. (Mar. 8, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-addiction-comes-families-second-
blow-crushing-cost-of-rehab-1520528850.
35 For a story of a mother buying heroin for her daughter to help wean her 
during a self-detox in order for her to be admitted to a treatment program 
that did not accept those in active addiction, see Anonymous, Why I Bought 
My Daughter Heroin, BBC News (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/
magazine-39212295.
36 “[F]indings from focus groups of counselors in rural areas noted . . . 
reliance on friends or family for transportation.” U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., The President’s Commission on Combating Drug 
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis 34 (2017) [hereinafter Commission 
Report]. On the reasons family engage in care work see Hoffman, supra note 
6, at 175 (discussing reasons family members engage in care work); “All fifty 
states have statutes that obligate certain adults to care for or financially support 
certain other family members.” Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the 
Modern Era: Domestic and International Comparison of Enforcement Practices for Laws 
Requiring Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents, 20 Elder Law J. 269, 270 
(2013). However, these are limited, for example, while “parents can [] be 
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It would be a mistake to think of this range of family 
involvement in SUD prevention, harm reduction, treatment, and 
recovery as independent of law, separate from and outside of our 
public health framework for regulating (and aspirationally reducing 
the cost of) SUD. Quite the opposite, our legal framework calls upon 
family to serve this role in ways that are at least foreseeable, if not 
intentional. 
SUD is an example of a chronic illness for which resources 
available through traditional public health, health care, and 
government entities are, at this writing, tragically insufficient. 
Institutional actors do not come close to ensuring that those who 
need treatment for SUD receive it; according to recent estimates, 
roughly 20% of the 20 million who need treatment for SUD receive 
it.37 As a result, for many sufferers, loved ones are both the first 
responders and the last resort.
Meanwhile, family members are not only a stopgap; they 
are well positioned to assist with many aspects of prevention, harm 
reduction, treatment, and recovery. Family members are often close 
to SUD patients which brings a special perspective and insight into 
their loved ones’ behaviors and needs.38 Moreover, the emotional 
connection that defines “family” makes family members particularly 
well suited to provide the community that many see as essential to 
preventing and treating addiction.39 And family can be (even if they 
obligated to pay support for adult-aged children . . . usually that obligation is 
tied to a continuing disability that preexisted age eighteen.” Id.
37 “[O]nly one in five people who currently need treatment for opioid use 
disorders is actually receiving it.” Surgeon General’s Report, supra note 
30, at III.
38 See Silverman, supra note 4, at 9 (“To care well, Kittay argues, caregivers 
must not only go through the motions of care, but they must also care about 
the person who depends on them . . . to do a good job with the rational, 
arduous, daily labor of caring, an ‘affective bond’ is necessary.”); id. at 96 
(identifying three comparative advantages of parents in assisting in a child’s 
treatment: “a familiarity with their child’s developmental trajectory and 
current behaviors . . . the continuous therapeutic opportunities offered by 
the activities of daily life, and their own biological kinship with the child, 
including shared personality traits and milder forms of the same symptoms”); 
id. at 137 (“As parents enter into professional areas of authority they do so 
by claiming that their love helps them determine how best to understand 
and treat their children. These claims about love are strong and sometimes 
risky.”).
39 See Dasgupta et al., supra note 19, at 184 (“[R]esearchers agree that such 
structural factors as lack of economic opportunity, poor working conditions, 
and eroded social capital in depressed communities, accompanied by 
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are not always) powerful sources of acceptance.40
As a result of the confluence of a shortage of social services 
and family’s unique ability to assist in addressing SUD, it is difficult 
to identify a way in which family currently assist their loved ones 
with SUD that is not predictably influenced by one or more aspects 
of our existing legal framework. Among other legal factors, the 
Anti-Kickback Statute limits providers’ ability to provide patients 
in recovery with free transportation and payer reimbursement 
policies that fail to compensate such arrangements often leave those 
in recovery with no way to obtain necessary, daily treatment, other 
than reliance on loved ones with legal access to a car.41 Shortages 
of Medicaid-eligible inpatient and outpatient treatment providers—
itself a function of Medicaid reimbursement rates42—often leave 
family members with the choice to either pay out of pocket 
themselves for their loved ones’ care or see them go without care. 
Lack of housing and job support for those in recovery, 43 as a matter 
of logic and inevitable necessity, can leave family invested in their 
loved ones’ health as the patient’s last resort. 
The goal of this discussion has been to call attention to such 
implicit deputization and encourage researchers and policymakers 
hopelessness and despair, are root causes of the misuse of opioids and other 
substances . . . .”) (quoting Nat’l Acad’s of Sci’s, Eng’g, and Med. 
et al., Pain Management and the Opioid Epidemic 1–9 (Richard J. 
Bonnie et al. eds., 2017)).
40 Cf. Silverman, supra note 4, at 236 (“Devotion is ideally an experimental 
procedure. It is especially so when, as parents often feel in the case of autism, 
it impels us to consider the object of our love as both a biological being, 
subject to manipulation and harm, and a person, precious and complete in his 
or her own right.”).
41 See Robert J. Baror, Transportation and the Anti-Kickback Statute: A Tortured Route 
with a New Safe Harbor, The Fed. Law., March 2015, at 18–20 (describing 
challenges entailed in providing transportation); Jeffrey Samet et al., It’s Time 
for Methadone to Be Prescribed as Part of Primary Care, Statnews (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/05/methadone-prescribed-primary-
care/ (“Stigma and a not-in-my-backyard mentality resulted in the placement 
of a sizable number of methadone clinics in locations that were hard for many 
to reach.”).
42 See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) 
(discussing claim that low Medicaid reimbursement rates deterred provider 
participation).
43 See Richard Littlewood et al., Housing for People with Substance Use Disorders: One 
Size Does Not Fit All Tenants—Assessment of 16 Housing Services and Suggestions for 
Improvement Based on Real World Experience, 55 Community Mental Health 
J., 331 (2019).
211Vol. 11, No. 1 Northeastern University Law Review
to be cognizant of it, not to catalog all instances of deputization. In 
these areas and the many others in which the law implicitly deputizes 
family, for those with loved ones who are in a position to be asked 
for help, the choice is not whether society will provide necessary 
services or not; the choice is whether it will do so through (usually 
paid) social workers, medical providers, and navigators or through 
(always unpaid) family members. As discussed in the next section, 
whether done implicitly or explicitly, the decision to deputize family 
is a weighty choice that implicates considerations beyond the health 
of the patient.
III. The Social Consequences of Deputizing Family
The preceding discussion of the role of family in fighting 
SUD underscores the importance of directing resources toward 
family caretakers. Family support groups like Learn to Cope 
based in Massachusetts, The Partnership for Drug Free Kids, Al 
Anon, Shatterproof, and others could be supported and spread, 
and educational resources could be improved in quality and made 
more readily available.44 Moreover, funding directed specifically 
44 Twelve Massachusetts-area organizations offering peer family support 
services are listed in the Massachusetts Organization for Addiction Recovery. 
Mass. Org. for Addiction Recovery, MOAR Mini-Guide with 
MOAR to Come 15 (2018), http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/8256b8_
c57f31e039d547cbb67e13fb84c6ceed.pdf. In other communities, such 
peer family support is not as readily available. See generally Addiction 
Resource Hub, https://resources.facingaddiction.org (last visited Nov. 
5, 2018). As for the availability of resources, the self-professed struggles of 
noted addiction reformers and policy experts are illustrative. University of 
Pennsylvania addiction research psychologist and former Senior Scientist for 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy Dr. Thomas McLellan explains 
that despite his expertise he found finding out how best to help care for a 
family member extremely difficult, observing “[i]f I don’t know, nobody else 
knows . . . . Where does a schoolteacher turn? How about a truck driver? How 
about a cop?” See How to Fix Rehab: Expert Who Lost Son to Addiction Has a Plan, 
nbcnews.com (Apr. 7, 2014, 5:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/
americas-heroin-epidemic/how-fix-rehab-expert-who-lost-son-addiction-
has-plan-n67946. Similarly, founder and CEO of Shatterproof Gary Mendell 
explains how his family “fought to navigate the complex and confusing web of 
treatment programs and therapies” in trying to care for a family member with 
SUD. Gary Mendell, A Father’s Promise, History, Shatter Proof, https://
www.shatterproof.org/about/history (last visited Feb. 2019). There are some 
excellent resources available, but particularly for a sufferer or family member 
new to addiction and its treatment, availability of information does not equal 
access to information.
212 Lawrence
to educating family members could ensure culturally competent 
resources by linking together families with similar backgrounds.45 
Such efforts could make family more effective in supporting those 
with addiction while simultaneously reducing the personal financial 
and emotional burdens of providing such support.
For some, this broader policy implication—that family of 
patients play a huge role in fighting disease and so are a promising 
target for resources, funding, and regulation—may not need further 
elaboration. It is important, however, to focus on the costs and 
benefits of deputizing family in fighting disease, for four reasons. 
First, family involvement may in some cases be a negative 
rather than a positive; it may do more harm than good. A stark 
example is that of an abusive spouse—the law should neither 
empower an abusive person nor force their spouse to rely on them 
for support or care in seeking treatment for illness.46 Teasing out the 
costs and benefits of deputizing family makes it possible to explore 
whether current and proposed regulatory approaches do more harm 
than good. 
Second, funding and manpower are finite; this is particularly 
true for SUD. We must sometimes decide not only which laws or 
approaches are beneficial, but which are sufficiently beneficial to 
justify the investment of scarce resources.
Third, legal scholars evaluating the wisdom vel non of 
involuntary treatment laws have begun to explore behavioral, 
societal, and ethical costs of such laws independent of their medical 
impacts.47 This growing, fuller understanding of the implications of 
such laws is improved by exploring their impacts on the deputized 
45 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 280i-1 (2018) (specific provision for educating families in 
addressing autism).
46 See generally Symposium on Reconceptualizing Violence Against Women by Intimate 
Partners: Critical Issues, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 1193 (1995).
47 See Leo Beletsky et al., Expanding Coercive Treatment is the Wrong Solution for the 
Opioid Crisis, Health Aff.: Health Aff. Blog (Feb. 11, 2016), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160211.053127/full/ (noting 
risk that threat of involuntary treatment will deter patients from seeking 
professional help); Leo Beletsky & Elisabeth Ryan, The Wrong Path: Involuntary 
Treatment and the Opioid Crisis,  Crime Rep.  (Aug. 16, 2017), https://
thecrimereport.org/2017/08/16/the-wrong-path-involuntary-treatment-and-
the-opioid-crisis/ (involuntary treatment “shift[s] financial responsibility for 
substance use treatment from insurers directly to taxpayers”); Ish P. Bhalla 
et al., The Role of Civil Commitment in the Opioid Crisis, 46 J. L. Med. & Ethics 
343 (2018) (discussing medical as well as ethical objections to involuntary 
treatment).
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family members as well.
Fourth, and finally, for those who are interested not only in 
reducing the harms of SUD but also putting in place structures to 
better address the next such crisis (which may well also be related to 
SUD), there are lessons to be taken from the failures and successes 
of our policy response thus far to the overdose crisis. Unlike 
researchers and policymakers, sick people do not have the luxury of 
waiting on political processes or scientific debates. Again, patients 
and their families are the first responders for any illness and, unless 
and until government or institutional resources are brought to bear, 
the last resort. By better understanding this default, double-edged 
weapon in the public health arsenal it may be possible to design 
policies that make family better at the job that illness, indifference, 
or choice force them to do, or at least to avoid hampering family in 
such work when desired by their loved ones. The addictions crisis 
reveals numerous ideas, examples, and potential pitfalls that can 
serve as lessons for the future. 
Part A below discusses the health impacts of laws deputizing 
family to address SUD. Part B discusses the need to consider impacts 
beyond direct consequences on patient health, namely, the social 
consequences of deputization, then discusses such impacts that 
are particularly implicated by laws deputizing family: interference, 
invisibility, and inequality. The next Part will offer and apply a 
framework for weighing such social consequences against health 
impacts in evaluating or crafting laws that deputize family from a 
welfare economic standpoint.
A. Health Consequences of Deputization
In addressing a disease—particularly one as widespread, 
debilitating, and deadly as SUD—it is natural and appropriate to 
focus on the health impacts of any reform or regulatory tool. So it 
is understandable that most scholarship that focuses on the role of 
family in the treatment of disease generally and in the treatment of 
SUD in particular has focused on medical impacts rather than on 
other potential benefits or costs of deputizing family.48 This is in 
48 See D.W. Best et al., Patterns of Family Conflict and Their Impact on Substance Use 
and Psychosocial Outcomes in a Sample of Young People in Treatment, 9 Vulnerable 
Child. & Youth Stud. 114, 114–22 (2014); Viviana E. Horigian et al., A 
Cross-Sectional Assessment of the Long Term Effects of Brief Strategic Family Therapy for 
Adolescent Substance Use, 24 Am. J. on Addiction 637 (2015) (discussing the 
specific outcomes of therapy focused on familial intervention and strengthening 
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contrast to scholarship on the provider-patient relationship, which 
has problematized laws that deputize doctors in bringing about 
particular policy outcomes.49
This health-focused research has tended to find that social 
relationships are a significant positive for SUD outcomes,50 though 
of familial bond in the aftermath of substance use). See generally Holt-Lunstad 
et al., supra note 5. Family Law textbooks address drug and alcohol use insofar 
as they may be implicated in divorce or custody proceedings but do not 
directly address the role or use of the family in prevention and treatment of 
SUD, chronic illness, or public health. See generally John DeWitt Gregory 
et al., Understanding Family Law (4th ed. 2013); Ira Mark Ellman 
et al., Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems (5th ed. 2010).
49 See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control: Furthering Partisan 
Interests at the Expense of Good Health, 48 New Eng. L. Rev. 293, 294, 318−19 
(2014) (describing Drudge Report headline that “Obama Deputizes Doctors” 
in response to Executive Order interpreting ACA provision as leaving doctors 
free to ask patients about guns and gun safety” (citing Affordable Care Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17 (2012)); Carol Gosain, Case Note, Protective Custody for 
Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem of Maternal Drug Use? Casenote on Wisconsin ex rel. 
Angela v. Kruzicki, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 799, 817 (1997) (discussing state 
law, complaining that “[b]y ‘deputizing’ doctors, the state interferes in the 
physician-patient relationship”); Derk B.K. VanRaalte IV, Note, Punitive Policies: 
Constitutional Hazards of Non-Consensual Testing of Women for Prenatal Drug Use, 5 
Health Matrix 443, 455 (1995) (criticizing requirement that physicians 
disclose pre-natal drug test results as “effectively ‘deputiz[ing] doctors to be 
police informers’”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
Harv. L. Rev. 22, 34 (1992) (describing requirements that physicians inform 
a woman seeking abortion of certain information as “deputiz[ing] doctors” 
in framing choice); id. at 94 (noting that Casey essentially held that “the state 
could no more deputize doctors than husbands as anti-abortion advocates”).
50 Surgeon General’s Report, supra note 30, at 3-11 (“A number of family-
focused, universal prevention interventions show substantial preventive 
effects on substance use.”); id. at 4-30 (“Mainstream health care has long 
acknowledged the benefits of engaging family and social supports to 
improve treatment adherence and to promote behavioral changes needed to 
effectively treatment many chronic illnesses. This is also true for patients with 
substance use disorders.”); id. at 4-25 (“Adherence to” naltrexone “increases 
under conditions where it is administered and observed by a trusted family 
member.”); see Simons et al., supra note 28, at 1−2 (“Most treatment research 
indicates that a family component is necessary for treatment to be effective, 
particularly with opiate addicts aged 15 to 25 years old.”) (collecting sources); 
see also id. at 2 (describing study as indicating “that families play a crucial role 
in the recovery process for adults with concurrent disorders”); Dasgupta et al., 
supra note 19, at 184 (providing evidence that social isolation contributes to 
drug misuse and substance misuse disorder and, conversely, that “protective 
family and social structures generate resilience that mitigates negative impacts 
from the collision of economic hardship, substance use, and depression”) 
(collecting sources); U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra note 
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scholars have questioned the health benefit of empowering family 
in specific areas such as involuntary treatment.51 The finding that 
family involvement has a salutary effect on SUD health outcomes is 
consistent with meta analyses addressing the health impacts of family 
involvement generally, which have found family to be a significant 
and positive social determinant of health.52 That said, none of these 
studies compared family support to other forms of social services, so 
the identified benefits may indicate only that family may fill a void 
where other social services are lacking, not that family are better 
than other more traditionally “public” sources of social services at 
promoting health when both are available.53
B. Social Consequences of Deputization
It is appropriate for health impacts to be a primary focus
of inquiry in consequential evaluation of laws directed at disease, 
but they should not be the only impacts considered. Such laws can 
have social, educational, employment, and financial consequences 
beyond their medical impacts. For a concrete example of such a 
“social consequence” of health care policy, look no further than the 
well-documented phenomenon of medical bankruptcy: bankruptcies 
that result ultimately from our regulatory framework for managing 
20, at 1 (“The family has a central role to play in the treatment of any health 
problem, including substance abuse.”); id. (“[E]vidence from the research that 
has been conducted . . . indicates that substance abuse treatment that includes 
family therapy works better than substance abuse treatments that do not . 
. . .”) (collecting sources); U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
Treatment Improvement Protocol 38, Integrating Substance 
Abuse Treatment and Vocational Services, at xv (2000) (“Years of 
research show that the best predictors of successful substance abuse treatment 
are gainful employment[,] adequate family support[, and] lack of coexisting 
mental illness . . . .”); cf. Kay Hymowitz, Opioid Deaths Are Surging Among Single 
and Divorced Americans, Especially Men, Inst. for Family Studies (Nov. 6, 
2017), https://ifstudies.org/blog/opioid-deaths-are-surging-among-single-
and-divorced-americans-especially-men (finding lower overdose rate among 
married population than non-married population, but noting that assuming 
causative connection would be problematic).
51 See, e.g., Dasgupta et al., supra note 19 (arguing for an approach that addresses 
the root causes of the opioid crisis).
52 See sources cited supra note 5.
53 Cf. Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of 
Dependency, at xviii (2004) (“It is very important to understand the roles 
assigned to the family in society—roles that otherwise might have to be played 
by other institutions, such as the market or the state.”).
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illness.54
A strand of feminist legal scholarship problematizing “care 
work” largely in the context of child care and long-term care for 
the elderly—unpaid labor by family caring for one another—
has unpacked social consequences that such labor implicates 
independent of health impacts.55 These considerations apply as 
well to laws that deputize family in fighting SUD, in many cases 
raising the possibility of new objections to or problems with such 
laws as discussed below. Understood in welfare economic terms, 
such considerations include: the potential for interference with 
the underlying family relationship; the invisibility of and lack of 
compensation for or societal recognition of the care work; and the 
inequality of relying on care work, particularly when its performance 
or availability is heterogeneous across genders, race, or class.
1. Interference
It is prudent to proceed with caution in using existing family 
relationships as a regulatory tool because family relationships 
themselves can be endogenous to the law, that is, family relationships 
can be shaped by the law. As Fineman puts it, “[f]ar from being 
separate and private, the family interacts with and is acted upon 
by other societal institutions . . . the very relationship is not one of 
separation, but of symbiosis.”56 Indeed, a motivating insight of the 
field of family law is that the formation of romantic partnerships and 
child rearing units is in some ways determined by legal recognition 
and treatment, so laws may be tailored to facilitate those relationships 
54 See Matthew J. Lawrence, Health Insurance’s Social Consequences Problem and 
How to Solve It, Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (collecting and 
describing sources).
55 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 172−73 nn.125−29 (collecting sources and 
surveying); Anne L. Alstott, No Exit: What Parents Owe Their 
Children and What Society Owes Parents (2005) ; Fineman, supra 
note 53; Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work 
Conflict and What to Do About It (2001); Sylvia A. Law, Women, 
Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1249 (1983); 
Katherine B. Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 1 (1996); Noah Zatz, Supporting Workers by Accounting for Care, 5 Harv. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 45 (2011)
56 Fineman, supra note 53. For a multi-layered example of the interaction 
between legal and institutional arrangements, on the one hand, and affective 
relationships on the other, in the context of a particular disorder, see generally 
Silverman, supra note 4, at 1−5 (framing love as a complicated and 
sometimes problematic resource).
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that society deems valuable.57 
The spousal evidentiary privilege serves as an enduring 
acknowledgement of this potential for the law to interfere with 
family relationships. This potential is a primary underlying rationale 
for the privilege. The reasoning is that if spouses could be compelled 
to testify against each other, then open communication between 
them would be chilled. So, courts provide an evidentiary privilege 
to such communications, protecting against disclosure in order to 
ensure that open communication between spouses is not deterred 
by the shadow of civil or criminal discovery.58 
In the context of SUD, this concern can be thought of as 
one of interference. Supportive family relationships are desirable 
both in the abstract and for their generally positive impact on SUD 
outcomes.59 Laws that interfere with the formation or maintenance 
of such relationships—that make it more costly for those with SUD 
to maintain close contact with their loved ones—could carry an 
interference cost that might itself outweigh any hypothetical medical 
benefit. 
The collateral consequences of civil forfeiture drug laws are a 
concrete illustration of this problematic interference effect associated 
with certain forms of deputization. Criminal accessory laws can make 
families vulnerable to civil forfeiture actions against their homes for 
57 Fineman, supra note 53 (“It is very important to understand the roles assigned 
to the family in society—roles that otherwise might have to be played by other 
institutions, such as the market or the state.”); Linda McClain, The Place 
of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility 
3, 8 (2006) (“[F]amilies have a place in the project of forming persons into 
capable, responsible, self-governing citizens. . . . [G]overnment properly 
takes an interest in families in light of the goods associated with families, 
the functions that families serve, and the political values at stake.”); Vivian 
Hamilton, Will Marriage Promotion Work?, 11 J. Gender, Race & Justice 1 
(2007) (providing survey of government policies promoting marriage). 
58 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (“The modern justification 
for this privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its perceived role in 
fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship.”); see also 
Development in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 
1579 (1985) (“Advocates of the privileges argue that privileges encourage 
intrafamily communications that are more valuable to the family than the 
evidence shielded from the courts is to society.”); cf. Julia Cardozo, Note, 
Let My Love Open the Door: The Case for Extending Martial Privileges to Unmarried 
Cohabitants, 10 U. Md. L.J. Race Religion Gender & Class 375 (2010) 
(arguing for expansion of marital communications privilege to unmarried 
cohabitants).
59 Supra Part III.A. 
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unlawful sales conducted by loved ones living with them. Several 
families in Philadelphia, for example, had their homes seized and 
were forced to vacate after the police arrested non-minor children on 
possession and sale charges that the families had permitted to live 
with them. Eventually, the police permitted the families to return to 
their homes—but allegedly only upon the condition that they would 
not let their SUD-patient loved ones return.60
Deputization and interference are both crystallized in this 
example. Drug laws conscript family members in the effort to 
prevent SUD by prohibition by subjecting them to penalties if they 
do not themselves ensure compliance with such prohibitions within 
their homes. Regardless whether this deputization carries medical 
benefits or costs, it also interferes directly with family relationships 
by discouraging sufferers from seeking housing with loved ones, 
and discouraging loved ones from permitting sufferers to live with 
them while using. By doing so, in turn, drug laws may undercut the 
ability of the family home to act as a sort of de facto safe injection site, 
potentially undermining health in turn.61
2. Invisibility
A second consideration presented by laws that deputize family is that 
the burdens of care work are often invisible, neither compensated nor 
recognized as a valuable form of work. In turn, because such efforts 
are invisible, policymakers can easily fail to take burdens on care 
workers into account. Benefits programs, for example, often fail to 
acknowledge the value, time, or effort of care work.62 In the context of 
60 See Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 116, 
Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 103 F. Supp. 3d 694 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (No. 
14-4687) (alleging that the ADA “informed Mr. Sourovelis that in order for 
his house to be unsealed so his family could return home, he and his wife 
would have to agree to a number of conditions, including agreeing that [their 
son] would not be permitted to enter his home for any reason for an indefinite 
period of time”). See generally Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 103 F. Supp. 
3d 694 (E.D. Pa. 2015). The case was later the subject of a civil lawsuit that 
partially settled. See Jeremy Roebuck, D.A.’s Office Reaches Partial Settlement 
in Forfeiture Suit, The Philadelphia Inquirer (June 24, 2015), http://
www.philly.com/philly/news/20150625_Phila__District_Attorney_reaches_
partial_settlement_in_civil_forfeiture_suit.html?mobi=true. 
61 See Jennifer Ng et al., Does Evidence Support Supervised Injection Sites?, 63 Canada 
Fam. Physician 866 (2017) (providing data supporting the positive outcomes 
of safe injection sites); cf. supra Part II.A (collecting sources reporting positive 
results from providing family members with access to Naloxone).
62 See Zatz supra note 55, at 46; see also Hoffman, supra note 6, at 196.
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childcare, the care work literature has “made compelling arguments 
for state support of caregiving based on the idea of caregiving as 
a public responsibility, a public good, a basic household need, or 
in order to help preserve women’s attachment to the workplace.”63 
Moreover, when it comes to helping in a loved one’s battle with 
illness, the invisibility of care work can mean an under-supply of 
educational resources and supports, which can leave care workers 
to teach themselves, even where minimal educational resources and 
support could go a long way in reducing the burdens on such care 
givers and improving the quality of their help.64
Helping a loved one in his or her medical struggle can be 
no less burdensome than child rearing or long-term care.65 For 
example, family caregivers of terminal cancer patients may suffer 
from “substantial psychological, occupational and economic burdens 
associated with caregiving.”66 Stenberg’s literature review of 164 
articles found similar burdens on caregivers of cancer patients.67
The burdens of care work are weighty in the treatment of 
SUD as well, though not yet studied as significantly. Caring for a 
loved one with SUD can be personally, psychologically, emotionally, 
and financially devastating—even if it also can be tremendously 
rewarding.68 Notably, many of these impacts stem not from having 
a loved one who is ill, but from the care work that comes with the 
diagnosis.69 As discussed above, the work loved ones do includes 
63 Hoffman, supra note 6, at 172−73 nn.125−130 (collecting and surveying 
sources).
64 Silverman, supra note 4, at 94 (describing “parents during the 1960s 
and 1970s who often found themselves with few resources other than each 
other in learning to treat their children”); id. at 96 (“[U]ntil the professional 
community can offer us more effective programs, we will often have to take 
matters into our own hands . . . .”).
65 Id. at 179−80 (“It is a full-time job driven by love, but accomplished 
through reason and experience, because ‘[t]his is our work. Everything else 
vanishes.’”).
66 Eva Grunfeld et al., Family Caregiver Burden: Results of a Longitudinal Study of 
Breast Cancer Patients and Their Principal Caregivers, 170 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 
1795, 1800 (2004).
67 See Una Stenberg et al., Review of the Literature on the Effects of Caring for a Patient 
with Cancer, 19 Psychooncology 1013 (2010)(reviewing 164 research-
based articles finding significant problems borne by family caregivers of 
cancer patients, including physical, social, and emotional problems and job 
and financial impacts).
68 See generally Conyers, supra note 4; Kaye, supra note 4. 
69 Dennis C. Daley, Family and Social Aspects of Substance Use Disorders, 21 J. Food 
& Drug Analysis S73 (2013) (discussing emotional burden, economic 
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transportation, advocacy, oversight, treatment, research, scheduling, 
and counseling. Yet the costs associated with these efforts are too often 
overlooked.  Indeed, even while the President’s Opioid Commission 
counted impacts on family members among the “inestimable” costs 
of the opioid epidemic, it acknowledged only their “suffering . . . as 
witnesses to addiction,” not the time, effort, money, or lead role in 
care that family members often take on.70 Family can in some ways 
be participants, not just witnesses, in their loved ones’ battle with 
addiction.
It should not be surprising, then, that public programs may 
fail to recognize the burden of care work to support those with 
SUD. Medicaid state waiver guidance published by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) on January 11, 2018 
is a recent example. Medicaid is a federal program by which states 
provide health insurance, subsidized by the federal government, to 
low income persons pursuant to federal standards. Under section 
1115 of the Medicaid statute, states may seek a “waiver” permitting 
them to alter eligibility, reimbursement, and other statutorily 
mandated criteria for their state Medicaid programs.
Several states have publicly expressed interest since the 
burden, relationship distress, and other adverse impacts of SUD on family 
members); see also id. (collecting sources). Daley’s encapsulation of the range 
of effects of SUD on family members warrants repeating in full: “Emotional 
burden. Members may feel anger, frustration, anxiety, fear, worry, depression, 
shame and guilt, or embarrassment. Economic burden. This may be caused by 
money spent on substances, or money problems associated with the loss of 
jobs or reliance on public assistance. Relationship distress or dissatisfaction. 
Families may experience high rates of tension and conflict related to the SUD 
and problems it causes in the family instability. This may result from abuse or 
violence, or family breakup due to separation, divorce, or removal of children 
from the home by Children and Youth Services. Effects on the developing 
fetus and children. Alcohol use during pregnancy can harm fetal development 
causing birth defects and problems in child development. Infants born 
to opioid-dependent mothers are at increased risk for neonatal abstinence 
syndrome, which can contribute to developmental or cognitive delays. 
Children of parents with SUDs are at increased risk for abuse or neglect, 
physical problems, poor behavioral or impulse control, poor emotional 
regulation, conduct or oppositional disorders, poorer academic performance, 
psychiatric problems such as depression or anxiety, and substance abuse. 
Effects on parents. Mothers with SUDs may show less sensitivity and 
emotional availability to infants. Parents of a child with a SUD may feel guilty, 
helpless, frustrated, angry, or depressed.” Id. 
70 The President’s Comm’n on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis, 
Opinion Letter on Recommendations to Combat the Addiction Crisis (Nov. 1, 
2017), at 31.
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beginning of the Trump Administration in using the 1115 waiver 
process to create some form of a “work requirement,” also called 
“community engagement,” that would make a person’s eligibility for 
Medicaid contingent on her maintenance of gainful employment or 
other community engagement.71 
In its January 11, 2018 guidance, CMS described how it 
recommends a state craft a waiver with some form of employment 
requirement in order to maximize the likelihood of CMS approval.72 
The document recognized that many who receive Medicaid 
are “engaged as caregivers for young children or elderly family 
members” and encourages states to recognize such care work. And 
the document explicitly addresses treatment of those “with opioid 
addiction and other substance use disorder,” again encouraging 
states to accommodate such individuals. But its list of potentially 
accommodating measures is focused exclusively on the Medicaid 
eligibility of the SUD patients themselves. 
Absent from the CMS guidance’s policy recommendations 
on care work and SUD is recognition of the time and effort many 
family members put into caring for loved ones with SUD. This invites 
state requirements that fail to recognize the value of such work and, 
counter-productively, force low-income family members to choose 
between either devoting daily attention and time to their loved ones’ 
illness or continuing to receive Medicaid.73 In other words, it invites 
71 Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in Healthcare for?, 70 
Stan. L. Rev. 1689, 1743 (2018) (“Like Indiana’s, Pennsylvania’s, and 
those of other states before it, Kentucky’s waiver proposal included work 
requirements for the population Governor Bevin called the ‘able-bodied,’ 
which the Obama Administration consistently refused to allow.”).
72 Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to state 
Medicaid Dir. (Jan. 11, 2018) (available at Medicaid.gov).
73 Under the granted Kentucky waiver, caregiving for a person with a 
“disabling medical condition” counts toward the community engagement 
requirement. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Kentucky 
Helping to Engage and Achieve Long Term Health (KY Health) 
Approval Package, 32 (2018). It is not apparent whether and under what 
circumstances Kentucky will include substance use disorder in this provision. 
The ADA excludes those who are “currently engaging” in illegal drug use 
from its definition of qualified individuals. That said, those in recovery 
may be considered disabled depending whether the addiction is considered 
a substantially limiting impairment. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity 
Comm’n, EEOCM1A, A Technical Assistance Manual on the 
Employment Provisions (Title 1) of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act §§ 8.2, 8.5 (1992); see Hartman v. City of Petaluma, 841 F. 
Supp. 949, 949 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Sharing 
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state requirements that have a blind spot for care work.
3. Inequality
Perhaps the main focus of the care work literature “has been 
to highlight the undervaluation and gendered nature of care work.”74 
Heavy reliance on care work—on family members’ uncompensated 
efforts—often poses profound inequality concerns because of gender 
imbalances in who performs this work. In short, “[c]aring labor 
most frequently falls to women.”75 Research exploring the role of 
family in fighting SUD should be attentive to identifying and perhaps 
exploring the possibility that gender imbalances are endemic in this 
area as they are in care work on child care.76  
Furthermore, the nature of care work on SUD creates the 
potential for a different form of inequality, in who benefits from 
such work rather than who performs it. Many of the tasks that 
family may assist with require cultural competence, time, and 
organization. Finding treatment providers that take insurance is an 
onerous task that—insofar as it entails navigating complex systems 
and bureaucracies and interacting with numerous strangers on the 
phone and in person—depends on cultural capital that may be less 
available based on race, class, or country of origin.77 In the somewhat 
related context of families’ abilities to advocate on behalf of children 
with autism in seeking special education resources, Baldwin-Clark 
the Dream: Is the ADA Accommodating All?, Chapter 4 (Oct. 2000), https://www.
usccr.gov/pubs/ada/ch4.htm.
74 Hoffman, supra note 6, at 172.
75 Silverman, supra note 4, at 6.
76 While not the purpose, design, or subject of the study, the fact that 78% 
of family members not themselves reporting substance use who obtained 
precautionary Naloxone access and training in Massachusetts were female in 
Bagley’s study is consistent with the possibility of gender disparities in the 
burden of care work on SUD. Bagley et al., supra note 32, at 151. In the future 
researchers should consider designing such studies to develop insight into the 
distribution of care work burdens.
77 See, e.g., Emily Corwin, Shortage Of Addiction Counselors Further Strained By 
Opioid Epidemic, NPR: Shots (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2016/02/24/467143265/shortage-of-addiction-counselors-
further-strained-by-opioid-epidemic; Binghui Huang, Medication could be key to 
addiction recovery, but in the Lehigh Valley few doctors prescribe such treatment, The 
Morning Call (May 4, 2018), http://www.mcall.com/business/health 
care/mc-nws-nhclv-mat-program-20180129-story.html; Beth Leipholtz, 
Shortage of Treatment Providers For Opioid Addiction Remains Issue For Many States, 
The Fix (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.thefix.com/shortage-treatment-
providers-opioid-addiction-remains-issue-many-states.
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found precisely this sort of structural inequality.78 
Access to health insurance coverage for SUD treatment and 
services is a potential example of inequality of the benefits of care 
work. Historically, mental health and addiction treatments and 
services have been subject to coverage exclusions and especially 
vigorous utilization review. The federal parity law seeks to counteract 
this tendency, forbidding insurers from treating mental health and 
addiction differently from other illnesses in coverage policies and 
decision-making.79 But enforcement of this law is uneven, and many 
advocates believe that access to addiction treatment is often barred 
by inappropriate coverage limitations.80
Under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), all claimants who 
seek and are denied coverage for a treatment or service by their 
insurer have the right to appeal that decision both to the insurer 
and to an independent, external reviewer.81 Available statistics show 
that such appeals are successful as much as 40% of the time,82 so 
appealing coverage denials is a promising way to overcome this 
potential barrier to treatment.
All patients are not equally positioned to appeal, however. 
Rather, a person’s functional ability to appeal an adverse coverage 
decision depends on her awareness of the appeals process, her 
cultural competence, her trust in institutions like the appeals process, 
her free time (or ability to hire help) to devote to the appeal, and 
so on.83 As scholars of civil procedure have long recognized, these 
78 See generally Latoya Baldwin-Clark, Beyond Bias: Cultural Capital in Anti-
Discrimination Law, 53 Harv. Civ. Rts-Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 281 (2018) 
(discussing sources on and describing racial and class-based disparities in 
access to special education services, linking these disparities to underlying 
disparities in cultural competence and capital in addition to bias). 
79 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2018).
80 See Valerie A. Canady, Ten States to Embark on New Campaign to Ensure Parity Lives 
Up to its Promise, 27 Mental Health Weekly, Nov. 20, 2017, at 5; Alex 
Gertner, Blue Cross Should Cover More Opioid Treatment, The News & Observer 
(June 8, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article212771774.
html (“I called several . . . programs and was told that BCBS rarely pays for 
this type of treatment.”).
81 See Katherine Vukadin, Hope or Hype?: Why the Affordable Care Act’s New External 
Review Rules for Denied ERISA Healthcare Claims Need More Reform, 60 Buff. L. 
Rev. 1201 (2012) (describing ACA rules).
82 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-11-268, Private Health 
Insurance: Data on Application and Coverage Denials 22, 23 
(2011) (finding that appeals were successful in reversing coverage denial 39 
to 59% of the time). 
83 Baldwin-Clark, supra note 78, at n.27. 
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variables can be correlated with income, education, age, race, and 
class, among other variables.84 Thus, our “system” for ensuring the 
accuracy of insurance coverage determinations may entail differential 
treatment, providing more “accurate” (however defined) favorable 
coverage determinations to those whose family connections have 
the capacity and wherewithal to appeal.
IV. Addressing Social Consequences
Whatever their theoretical relevance, actually measuring 
social consequences like interference, invisibility, and inequality 
and weighing them against more easily ascertained impacts—in 
particular medical impacts—is hard to do, as discussed in Part A. This 
“knowledge problem” is a reason to invest in evaluation and research 
that is open to social consequences when implementing new laws 
that deputize family, as Part B illustrates with the case of involuntary 
treatment laws. Moreover, the “break-even” analysis approach used 
to incorporate hard-to-quantify variables in administrative law 
cost-benefit analysis provides a framework for assessing laws that 
deputize family, as discussed in Part C. And that framework can 
and should be employed to evaluate the wisdom of a legal change 
from a welfare economic perspective, as Part D’s discussion of the 
choice architecture of consent to disclosure of protected information 
related to SUD treatment demonstrates.
A. Health, Love, and Knowledge
Incorporating the problems of interference, invisibility, and 
inequality in crafting laws that regulate health (or other behaviors) is 
challenging, in two ways. First is the problem of measurement, that 
is, of predicting how likely a legal change is to influence a behavior 
that it might theoretically influence. 
Measurement is a particular problem for assessing 
interference with family relationships.85 It is difficult enough to 
predict and measure the medical impact of a law that operates 
84 Marc Galanter is generally cited as the origin of this insight about the nature 
of procedural rules. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc’y Rev. 95 (1974).
85 As for invisibility and inequality, observing unseen labor and identifying 
disparities in the provision or availability of such unobserved labor pose 
challenges of their own, though when it comes to measurement these 
challenges are not as imposing as those for measuring interference. The 
more policymakers bring care work into the visible realm, the more it will be 
possible to assess inequality in its burdens and benefits.
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through third parties such as family members, even though health 
is a concrete and relatively measurable outcome.86 Assessing the 
impact of such a law on the formation of caring relationships is 
much harder. While a promising history of scholarship seeks to track 
family relationships,87 such relationships are not as readily measured 
as health status indicators or health outcomes. Moreover, measuring 
the causal effect of law on such relationships is complicated by the 
fact that such effects are unlikely to be instantaneous, necessitating 
long-term observation.88 While it is possible and desirable that 
researchers might combine scholarship tracking family relationships 
with scholarship tracking the effect of law on behavior,89 such work 
is not readily available.90 In short, interference impacts are difficult 
86 See U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra note 20, at 12 
(explaining that “federally funded research into substance abuse treatment 
has focused on . . . individual-specific treatments” in part because “research 
with families is difficult and costly”); Simons et al., supra note 28, at 2 
(“Methodological limitations and challenges associated with implementing 
family interventions in treatment settings may contribute to the mixed 
findings about the effectiveness of family components for adult substance 
abusers.”).
87 E.g. Susan M. McHale et al., Sibling Relationships and Influences in Childhood and 
Adolescence, 74 J. Marriage & Fam. 913 (2012); Clare M. Stocker et al., 
Sibling Relationships in Early Adulthood, 11 J. Fam. Psychol. 210 (1997).
88 The positive impacts of an intervention in this space may flow directly from 
the intervention itself and so be direct and immediate; for example, any 
benefit associated with involuntary treatment for the patient is immediately 
observable in the patient themselves and comes straight from the intervention. 
But upstream (or downstream, depending on one’s point of view) behavioral 
impacts of such interventions may be largely a function of the incorporation 
of knowledge of the rule into public awareness. In order for a bystander’s 
decision whether to call for help when a friend overdoses to be influenced 
by “immunity” laws, she must know about those laws, so too, in order for a 
patient to avoid family for fear of involuntary treatment she must know about 
involuntary treatment laws. Such long-run behavioral impacts will presumably 
take time and widespread adoption and implementation (or education) to 
develop, so it will be very difficult to pick up in a typical study population. 
89 See D. James Greiner & Andrea Matthews, Randomized Control Trials in the United 
States Legal Profession, 12 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 295 (2016) (discussing 
the usefulness of incorporating randomized control trials into the legal 
profession).
90 Researchers might use the fact that a person must know about a law for 
it to affect her behavior to measure interference with family relationships. 
Specifically, researchers might consider randomizing disclosures to patients 
about particular laws in their state—such as involuntary treatment laws, 
civil forfeiture laws, or immunity laws—in order to assess any differential 
downstream behavioral implications for family relationships, consistent of 
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to measure and predict.
A related problem for incorporating social consequences is 
that of quantification, that is, of converting a particular concern into 
terms by which it might be weighed against traditionally financial or 
medical impacts. This quantification challenge is a particular problem 
for inequality, which is recognized as difficult- if not impossible-to-
quantify.91 Some have argued that it would be better to have an equal 
system than an unequal one so, 92 for example, we should not have 
an appeals process for insurance coverage decisions at all unless we 
can design one that is equally accessible in practice to all and so does 
not exacerbate inequality. Tradeoffs that permit unequal treatment 
of anyone, or of any vulnerable group, may simply be intolerable and 
not susceptible to quantification and comparison with more fungible 
values. 
On the other hand, Kaplow and Shavell have argued that 
rather than incorporate some distributional considerations in 
regulatory design, regulators should design the optimal regulatory 
apparatus, then somehow repay or offset any inequities through taxes 
or subsidies for those subject to them. It is possible to envision this 
approach being used to better account for inequality in consequential 
analysis of deputization; the value of unpaid labor (and hypothetical 
cost of repaying those who perform it) might be used to quantify 
unequal distribution of burdens, and the value of assistance (and 
hypothetical cost to provide it through state-sponsored navigators 
or other supports) might be used to quantify unequal distribution 
of benefits.93
In any event, the fact of measurement and quantification 
challenges in assessing social consequences like interference, 
invisibility, and inequality does not mean that such consequences do 
not exist or that scholars or policymakers should not consider them 
in weighing laws or reforms.94 To the contrary, this quantification 
course with governing ethical requirements and IRB approval. 
91 See Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life (2014) (discussing the difficulty of 
quantifying human dignity).
92 See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus 
Welfare (2006) (discussing such arguments).
93 See id. (making such an argument).
94 Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of 
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 122 (2016) (“The 
problem with this argument [that difficult-to-quantify values should be 
ignored] is that the zero probability is even more arbitrary than the regulator’s 
prior.”). 
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challenge creates a risk that such impacts will be ignored, and so 
a danger that policymakers will adopt policies that appear to be 
beneficial or at least neutral in the short-term data capable of and 
subject to measurement, like impact on a particular patient’s health, 
even while being problematic or counter-productive overall or in the 
long run.95
B. The Need for Research into the Social Consequences of 
Deputization: The Case of Involuntary Treatment Laws
Consideration of the risk of interference, invisibility, 
and inequality in deputization—the “social consequences” of 
deputization—can, even in the face of the knowledge problem 
discussed above, reveal the need for and guide further research 
before concluding that a policy is beneficial. Indeed, fear that efforts 
to regulate family will ultimately backfire is one of the reasons for 
the “[t]radition of [n]oninterference” in family law.96 In other words, 
the possibility of social consequences can at a minimum provide a 
reason for restraint before concluding that any particular reform that 
deputizes family is desirable, or for including in such laws provisions 
to ensure the development of better information regarding their full 
range of impacts and revisitation as necessary. Involuntary treatment 
laws offer an example of such a reform as to which there is enough 
reason for concern about social consequences to justify continuing 
research. 
A growing body of state legislative reforms empower family 
members to petition to have their loved ones sent for involuntary 
treatment. Such laws generally empower family or doctors to ask a 
court to force a person into treatment for SUD on the ground that 
the disorder creates a “likelihood of serious harm.”97 Pennsylvania’s 
proposed statute is illustrative: it would empower a “spouse, 
guardian, or relative” to bring a petition.98 
The claim that such laws actually carry a benefit in terms of 
health is dubious. For example, Beletsky and Ryan survey concerns 
with these laws, noting that voluntary treatment is more effective 
95 See Sunstein, supra note 91; Masur & Posner, supra note 94. 
96 See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family 
Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1837 (1985) (“The law not only suspects that 
intervention will do harm; it doubts that intervention will do good . . . .”).
97 Beletsky & Ryan, supra note 47 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws c. 123, § 35 (2018)); 
see also id. (describing 33 related state laws).
98 S. 391, 2017−18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017); Bhalla et al., supra note 47, at 2.
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than involuntary treatment, particularly for those with mental 
illness or other health needs and that involuntary treatment passes 
costs from insurers to the state.99 Along the same lines, Bhalla and 
co-authors express doubts about the medical consequences of these 
laws and also express ethical objections.100
Such laws may also have social consequences that weigh 
against their adoption. In theory, empowering family members to 
force their loved ones into involuntary commitment could raise 
precisely the same concern that motivates the spousal privilege 
and the enhanced privacy protection provided to SUD treatment-
related medical information, namely, concern about chilling 
communication.101 If awareness and utilization of such laws were 
widespread, they could theoretically discourage those with SUD 
from disclosing the extent of their addiction to loved ones, disclosing 
their location to loved ones, acknowledging a relapse to loved ones, 
and so on, for fear that such information would prompt and/or be 
used against them in an involuntary treatment proceeding.102 
This potential concern is connected to the fact that in many 
states, involuntary treatment laws not only explicitly limit the class 
of petitioners to family, but also make information the family might 
have gleaned from their loved one the primary focus of the court’s 
decision whether to order the patient into treatment. For example, 
Pennsylvania’s proposed involuntary treatment law requires the 
petition assert:
The petitioner’s belief, including the factual basis for the 
belief, that the respondent is suffering from alcohol 
and other drug abuse and presents an imminent 
99 See Beletsky & Ryan, supra note 47; see also Leo Beletsky et al., Expanding Coercive 
Treatment is the Wrong Solution for the Opioid Crisis, Health Aff.: Health 
Aff. Blog (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20160211.053127/full/ (making similar finding).
100 See Bhalla et al., supra note 47 (offering survey of medical and ethical objections 
to civil commitment).
101 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052, 
6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2)(The spousal privilege 
is motivated by a desire to encourage communication between spouses, 
enhanced privacy for SUD medical information by a desire to encourage 
communication with providers.).
102 Cf. Why I Abandoned Tough Love Instead of My Child, Woman’s Day (July 1, 
2016), https://www.womansday.com/health-fitness/wellness/a55379/help-
for-parents-of-drug-addicts/ (discussing one mother’s perspective that her 
prior “tough love” approach had interfered with her son’s efforts at recovery). 
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danger or imminent threat of danger to self, family or 
others, or that there exists a substantial likelihood of 
such a threat in the near future, if the respondent is 
not treated for alcohol or other drug abuse.103
Accordingly, to someone who does not wish to pursue 
treatment, family in a state with an involuntary treatment law could 
theoretically present a double threat: the law directly empowers 
the family member to petition to force the patient into involuntary 
treatment, and the law makes whatever information the family 
member might have learned from his loved one central to the court’s 
willingness to initiate involuntary treatment proceedings. This 
poses the risk of twin chills: first, against one’s willingness to even 
tell family that they may have SUD or, if they know, inform family 
of their location; and second, against one’s willingness to disclose 
details of their addiction to family for fear those details might be 
used against them.
Involuntary treatment laws also may pose invisibility and 
inequality concerns. Family usually must pay for the treatment 
received, and going through the petition process poses significant 
logistical and emotional burdens for family, who are of course not 
paid for their efforts. As for inequality, as a means to identify and 
push into treatment those who need it such laws pose a real risk 
of disparities: as discussed above, civil procedure scholars have 
observed in other contexts that the meaningfulness of such an opt-in 
procedural mechanism can vary significantly across the population.
To be sure, these are only potential, theoretical concerns 
about the possible social consequences of involuntary treatment 
laws. It may be that involuntary treatment laws have no impact on 
underlying family relationships currently and would still have no 
impact even if their existence became both widespread and widely 
known. On the other hand, it is accepted that fear of being subject to 
law enforcement discourages bystanders from calling for help when 
a friend overdoses; this is the behavioral rationale for immunity 
laws.104 It is an open question whether the same sort of fear would 
tend to discourage a person who is aware that a loved one might 
initiate involuntary treatment proceedings from informing that 
103 S. 391, 2017−18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017)(emphasis added).
104 See Corey Davis et al., Changing Law from Barrier to Facilitator of Opioid Overdose 
Prevention, 41 J.L. Med. & Ethics 33, 34 (2013) (discussing need “to 
encourage bystanders to summon emergency responders” behind such laws).
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loved one of her illness, relapse, or location.
This concern about potential interference does not shed any 
additional light on the acute health impacts of involuntary treatment 
on the treated individual. However, it adds the following macro-level 
caution for further inquiry: such deputization mechanisms may alter 
the power dynamics within a family and so their widespread adoption 
and use may change family behaviors broadly. Moreover, any benefits 
and burdens they create are unpaid and may be distributed unfairly. 
It is important that legislators and policymakers investigate and 
assess such possible detrimental impacts on the family’s ability to 
improve health, reduce mortality, improve access, and aid in recovery 
in considering if any hypothetical benefits for access to treatment in 
an individual case are worthwhile. Moreover, where policymakers 
prefer to enact legislation despite uncertainty, they should include 
in such legislation provisions facilitating information gathering and 
policy re-assessment, such as providing funding for an agency report 
upon the health and social consequences of the law.105 
This is not to say that gleaning quality information about 
social consequences by tracking a reform’s effects would be easy. 
Assessing the impact of a state policy change never is.106 But while 
perfect information may be unattainable, laws and studies can be 
designed to provide helpful information and, so, facilitate better 
policy.107
C. Accounting for the Social Consequences of Deputization
with Break-Even Analysis
No amount of feasible research will remove all uncertainty 
surrounding the social consequences of deputization. Extensive 
literature in administrative law on the theory and practice of cost-
benefit analysis, however, discusses how policymakers can and 
should incorporate uncertain costs and benefits into their decision-
making.108 This scholarship on the theory and practice of “cost-
105 C.f. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
1946, 124 Stat. 119, 582 (2010) (mandating Secretary of HHS to evaluate 
data collection regarding health disparities and submit report to Congress 
recommending ways to improve such data collection).
106 See Kristin Madison, Building a Better Laboratory: The Federal Role in Promoting 
Health System Experimentation, 41 Pepp. L. Rev. 765, 777−83 (2014) 
(discussing impediments to such knowledge gathering). 
107 For general discussion of the construction of reforms to encourage knowledge 
development, see id. at 784 n.84. 
108 E.g., Sunstein, supra note 91; Masur & Posner, supra note 94; Amy Sinden, 
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benefit analysis” discusses how administrative agencies should make 
evidence-informed decisions about hard-to-quantify or qualitative 
considerations. The insights of this line of scholarship can be applied 
to incorporate the social consequences of deputization as well.
Specifically, “break-even analysis” is a normative framework 
for decision-making in the face of hard-to-quantify costs or benefits.109 
This is an approach cost-benefit scholars and policymakers employ 
when, as occurs “[m]uch of the time, we cannot quantify the benefits 
of potential courses of action, or the costs, or both, and we must 
nonetheless decide whether and how to proceed.”110 In essence, 
breakeven analysis “quantifies what can be quantified, acknowledges 
what cannot, and adopts a specific framework to help regulators 
decide how to proceed in the way of limited information.”111 In 
practice, it entails establishing reasonable upper and/or lower 
“bounds” as thresholds that benefits would have to reach to be 
justified (or that costs would have to reach to counsel caution), then 
utilizes all available evidence to estimate whether the benefits (or 
costs) are sufficient to meet that threshold.112 In short, break-even 
analysis simply dictates that “when an agency faces uncertainty, it 
should ask itself, ‘how small could the value of the non-quantified 
benefits be (or how large would the value of the non-quantified costs 
need to be) before the rule would yield zero net benefits.’”113 
None of this is to say that policymaking should not be 
evidence based; it’s quite the opposite. Break-even analysis provides 
a framework through which policymaking can be more informed by 
evidence and also helps in determining where and how evidence 
should be developed. 
D. Application: The Choice Architecture of Disclosure to and
by Family
Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015 Utah L. Rev. 93 (2015). 
109 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 1369 (2014). 
110 Id. at 1369.
111 Id. at 1372.
112 Id. at 1385−87 (illustrating the factors of break-even analysis and 
unquantifiable factors in analysis). See also Pranav Kumar Choudhary et al., 
Break-Even Analysis in Healthcare Setup, 1 Int’l J. of Res. Found. Hosp. & 
Healthcare Admin. 29, 30–32 (2013) (describing break-even analysis in the 
healthcare world).
113 Masur & Posner, supra note 94, at 124 (quoting Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis 2 (2003)).
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This subpart demonstrates how the above framework can 
be used to evaluate and demonstrate the desirability of laws that 
deputize family in health care, weighing and comparing health 
impacts with social impacts including interference, invisibility, and 
inequality. It does so by evaluating two potential changes to the 
choice architecture of privacy deputization for disclosure of SUD 
information: an active choice approach (as compared to an opt-in or 
opt-out approach) and supported decision-making.
Private information pertaining to SUD treatment is protected 
from disclosure by both HIPAA and 42 C.F.R. Part 2, itself a 
creature of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. This protection restricts applicable 
providers’ ability to share medical information with those other 
than the patient. The Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) and the President’s Commission have each recognized that 
misunderstandings about HIPAA can lead to “obstacles to family 
support that [are] crucial to the proper care and treatment” of SUD 
sufferers.114 
While restricting disclosure of SUD treatment information 
carries a downside when it prevents a doctor from informing a family 
member that the patient would like informed, it carries a significant 
benefit when the promise of privacy encourages a person to come 
forward and seek treatment for SUD despite the heavy stigma 
surrounding the illness. The judgment—not questioned here—
that the benefits of privacy under current requirements outweigh 
the associated costs is reflected in the statutory and regulatory 
protection currently afforded under HIPAA and Part 2. 
This subpart focuses on a discrete but nonetheless important 
aspect of the experience of privacy for SUD patients distinct from 
the privacy requirements themselves: the choice architecture of 
deputization. As discussed in subsection 1, below, both HIPAA and 
Part 2 permit patients to authorize disclosures to family members, 
that is, to deputize family as eligible recipients of protected medical 
information. Yet the “choice architecture” of such deputization—
how and when patients may enlist (or recognize) the help of family 
114 HHS Offices fo r Ci vil Ri ghts Is sues Gu idance on  Ho w HIPAA Al lows Information 
Sharing to Address the Opioid Crisis, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. 
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/27/hhs-office-
civil-rights-issues-guidance-how-hipaa-allows-info-sharing-address-opioid-
crisis.html. Commission Report, supra note 36, at 122 (noting 42 C.F.R. 
Part 2 as a barrier and modification to that regulation “to permit the sharing 
of this type of information among health care providers and the loved ones of 
those suffering from SUDs”).
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in navigating their treatment by authorizing disclosure to them—
varies significantly between HIPAA and Part 2. 
1. Choice Architecture of Deputization for SUD Disclosures
HIPAA applies broadly to medical providers to limit the 
disclosure of protected health information.115 HIPAA’s privacy 
protections are a creature of privacy regulations promulgated by HHS 
under a broad delegation of statutory authority, and so all aspects 
of these protections can be changed through the administrative 
process.116 
Because of concern that SUD sufferers avoid treatment for 
fear of their illness being exposed to employers, family, or others, 
Part 2 offers additional protections for the disclosure of protected 
health information collected by certain SUD treatment providers.117 
Part 2 is largely a creature of regulation that can be changed through 
the administrative process, but the underlying statutory delegation 
is not as broad and so constrains both the breadth of the agency’s 
discretion to alter the rules through the administrative process and 
the scope of the agency’s permissible authority.118 
Current HIPAA and Part 2 rules permit patients to deputize 
family, empowering them to receive protected information or even 
consent to additional disclosures.119 The manner and context of such 
115 45 C.F.R. § 164.104(a)(1)−(3) (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (2018); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.502 (2018). 
116 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104−191, 110 Stat. 1936; 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a) (2018).
117 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 
6052, 6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“The laws and 
regulations governing the confidentiality of substance use disorder records 
were written out of great concern about the potential use of substance use 
disorder information against individuals, causing individuals with substance 
use disorders not to seek needed treatment. The disclosure of records of 
individuals with substance use disorder has the potential to lead to a host of 
negative consequences, including: Loss of employment, loss of housing, loss 
of child custody, discrimination by medical professionals and insurers, arrest, 
prosecution, and incarceration.”).
118 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1992) (amended 1998).
119 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g) (2018); 45 C.F.R. 164.510(b) (2018); 42 C.F.R. 
2.31 (2018); Office for Civil Rights Headquarters, Guidance: Personal 
Representatives, Health Information Privacy (Sept. 19, 2003), https://www.
hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/personal-representatives/
index.html; Elizabeth Snell, Do HIPAA Regulations Need Updates on Patient 
Privacy?, Health IT Security (Aug. 15, 2017), https://healthitsecurity.
com/news/do-hipaa-regulations-need-updates-on-patient-privacy.
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deputization differs markedly between the programs, however. 
When it comes to family involved in a patient’s treatment, 
HIPAA generally leaves it to providers to decide case-by-case whether 
the patient’s consent to disclosure should be opt-in or opt-out and 
how opt-in or opt-out should occur.120 In other words, providers 
choose whether and how to seek patients’ input about consenting to 
disclosure to family—at the start of treatment, the end, verbally, in 
writing, explicitly, implicitly, etc. HHS did not discuss the decision 
to leave this choice architecture to the discretion of providers at 
length in the privacy rule but did explain that this approach permits 
providers to use their medical judgment about the best course.121
Part 2, on the other hand, makes deputization opt-in. A 
patient must affirmatively agree to disclosure in writing, and this 
agreement must satisfy certain regulatory criteria for duration, 
specificity, and so on.122 Consistent with the underlying concern 
about encouraging patients with SUD to seek treatment without 
fear of discovery or embarrassment given societal stigma, this makes 
the default presumption one of non-disclosure to friends and family, 
i.e., of isolation.
Turning to the scope of deputization, HIPAA allows patients 
to empower their family or friends to permit further disclosures 
under very limited circumstances.123 Specifically, if a patient has 
granted authority to “mak[e] decisions related to health care” to 
another, then that deputy is also authorized under HIPAA to permit 
disclosures of protected information, for example, to an additional 
provider.124 The regulations do not permit patients to empower a 
loved one to authorize such disclosures without taking the further 
step of also empowering the loved one to make medical decisions. 
The scope of deputization under Part 2 is even more limited. 
A patient can only empower another to help coordinate her care by 
authorizing disclosure or re-disclosure by making that person her 
legal guardian. Moreover, the regulations include a requirement, 
120 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (a)(2) (2018) (provider can either seek patient’s 
affirmative consent or disclose when patient does not take advantage of an 
“opportunity to object” provided that such disclosure is within the patient’s 
best interest and consistent with any prior expressed preference he or she may 
have).
121 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82462, 82664 (Dec. 28, 2000).
122 42 C.F.R. § 2.31(a) (2018).
123 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(2) (2018).
124 Id.
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not included in the statute, prohibiting re-disclosure of protected 
information by its recipient.125 
2. The Preferability of Break-Even Analysis over HHS’s 
Regulatory Approach
HHS substantially revised Part 2 in 2017.126 The agency 
focused exclusively on operational costs of changes to the rule in 
its Regulatory Impact Analysis, as if Part 2 did not have important 
impacts on the health of SUD sufferers as well.127 This is in contrast 
to the effort of other agencies to pull apart and carefully consider even 
uncertain benefits and costs in rulemaking.128 This is characteristic 
of HHS, however; a recent study of the use of cost-benefit analysis 
in rulemaking showed HHS as the agency that most frequently failed 
to engage in cost-benefit analysis ostensibly called for by Executive 
Order.129
It would have been preferable for HHS to engage in some form 
of cost-benefit analysis, perhaps including break-even analysis, that 
grappled with the various costs and benefits of Part 2 as they related 
to the revised rule, for four reasons. First, Part 2 implicates a host of 
important considerations and analysis of these considerations would 
reduce the likelihood that current rules might fail to accurately 
balance them. 
Foremost, of course, is the benefit that protecting the privacy 
of SUD treatment information may encourage individuals to seek 
treatment who would otherwise fear adverse consequences from 
unwanted disclosure to employers, law enforcement, loved ones, 
125 Compare 42 C.F.R. § 2.32 (2018) (prohibition on re-disclosure), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 290dd-2(a) (1992) (amended 1998) (limiting disclosures by treatment 
providers).
126 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052 
(Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2).
127 Id. at 6109 (“When estimating the total costs associated with changes to the 
42 C.F.R. part 2 regulations, we assumed five sets of costs: updates to health 
IT systems costs, costs for staff training and updates to training curriculum, 
costs to update patient consent forms, costs associated with providing patients 
a list of entities to which their information has been disclosed pursuant to 
a general designation on the consent form . . . and implementation costs 
associated with the List of Disclosures requirements.”).
128 See generally Sunstein, supra note 91 (discussing such efforts); Masur & 
Posner, supra note 94, at 124 (same).
129 Masur & Posner, supra note 94, at 124 (describing the HHS as “dominat[ing]” 
list of agencies that produced regulations for which “either benefits or costs 
(or both) were not quantified at all).
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and so on. HHS mentioned this motivating benefit of Part 2 in the 
preamble to its rule.130 
While encouraging patients to seek treatment is paramount, 
a countervailing concern is that Part 2 imposes a cost by making 
coordination among providers more difficult.131 Again HHS 
mentioned this countervailing cost of Part 2 in the preamble 
to its rule in describing the underlying protection, but did not 
either quantify or purport to weigh it in relation to its proposed 
revision, despite emphasizing the importance of balancing it with 
the access-promoting purposes of Part 2.132 Moreover, various 
commentators have identified, implicitly or explicitly, additional 
considerations: Part 2 helps lower the likelihood of employment, law 
enforcement, custody, or other discrimination on the basis of SUD. 
Such discrimination can be intrinsically bad above and beyond its 
relationship to chilling treatment and associated health impacts.133 
And Part 2 makes it harder for law enforcement to identify and 
prosecute those with SUD to the extent their SUD brings illegal 
activity; some believe that such law enforcement activity can itself 
be harmful rather than helpful for a variety of reasons and on that 
view any policy change that makes it easier as a cost rather than a 
130 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 
6052, 6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“The laws and 
regulations . . . were written out of great concern about . . . causing individuals 
with substance use disorders not to seek needed treatment.”).
131 See Jennifer K. Manuel et al., Confidentiality Protections Versus Collaborative Care 
in the Treatment of Substance Use Disorders, 8 Addiction Sci. Clinical Prac. 
13 (2013).
132 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052, 
6077 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“With respect to 
obstacles to information sharing, one of SAMHSA’s goals for this rulemaking 
is to ensure that patients with substance use disorders have the ability to 
participate in and benefit from new integrated health care models without 
fear of putting themselves at risk of adverse consequences.”); id. at 6089 
(“SAMHSA acknowledges the legitimate concerns of commenters regarding 
how care coordination relates to patient safety. However, SAMHSA must 
consider the intent of the governing statute [], which is to protect the 
confidentiality of substance use disorder patient records.”).
133 See, e.g., Karla Lopez & Deborah Reid, Discrimination Against Patients with 
Substance Use Disorders Remains Prevalent and Harmful: The Case for 42 C.F.R. Part 
2, Health Aff.: Health Aff. Blog (Apr. 13, 2017) (“The confidentiality 
law is often the only shield between an individual in recovery from addiction 
and the many forms of discrimination and prejudice that could destroy their 
lives.”).
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benefit.134 
Second, a more fulsome analysis explaining whether and why 
the agency’s experts saw chilling concerns as outweighing medical 
coordination benefits from loosening Part 2 would go further toward 
persuading proponents of medical coordination that HHS had struck 
the right balance. Numerous provider groups support changes to 
Part 2, presenting the law as an “outdated” barrier to information 
sharing among providers.135 A fuller explanation of costs and benefits 
of these changes from HHS might persuade proponents they are not 
worthwhile, and would provide a greater foundation upon which any 
future Congressional consideration could be built to be sure that 
Congress does not miss tradeoffs, predictions, or valuations that 
might have been implicit but unarticulated in HHS’s rulemaking. 
Third, even when costs and benefits are inevitably uncertain, 
teasing them out to the extent possible in a systemic way facilitates 
subsequent research and revisitation of crucial policy assumptions. 
As will be discussed at greater length below, a strength of break-
even analysis is that it helps to pinpoint questions on which further 
research might be both possible and determinative, and so encourages 
regulators continually to reassess policies as new information comes 
to light.136 
Fourth, a break-even analysis would increase the likelihood 
that the agency identified and considered viable alternatives and 
tweaks to its chosen approach.137 The following sections will 
illustrate this with regard to the consent provisions of the rule. 
All that said, cost-benefit analysis of the Part 2 rule would 
not have been without downsides. Paramount, perhaps, is the risk 
of overestimating costs of Part 2 and underestimating benefits. 
The costs of Part 2—interfering with care coordination—are highly 
visible to health care providers. Its benefits, however—an increased 
likelihood that patients will seek treatment—are not as visible. 
134 See id. (describing “arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating people because of 
their illness” as a cause of stigma surrounding SUD).
135 See generally Partnership to Amend 42 CFR Part 2, www.
helpendopioidcrisis.org (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
136 See Masur & Posner, supra note 94, at 126 (noting that “[t]his review of priors 
could take place as part of the broader retrospective review of regulations”).
137 For example, “[s]everal commenters expressed concerns that the prohibition 
on re-disclosure did not improve patient privacy protections,” Confidentiality 
of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052, 6090 (Jan. 
18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2), but HHS did not respond to that 
comment or explain why it disagreed.  
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Providers are plainly much less likely to encounter people who were 
deterred from seeking treatment by fear of disclosure; relatedly, the 
population of people that providers do meet are likely to be those 
for whom fear of disclosure did not wind up being determinative. 
And providers themselves experience the inconvenience and harms 
of Part 2 to the extent that it limits coordination. As such, a large, 
well-informed and connected constituency for Part 2 may tend to 
underestimate the benefits of Part 2 and overestimate its costs.138 
This presents the risk that this bias would infect break-even analysis 
as well.
Concern that some benefits or costs may be overemphasized 
is a reason to be careful in engaging in break-even analysis, or even to 
endorse a presumption in such analysis in favor of the likely-under-
exposed value. It is not, however, a reason to refuse to admit the 
possibility that the value might not be worthwhile in some cases or 
to explain analytically how and why benefits of a rule outweigh the 
costs. Indeed, that approach might be counterproductive because, 
as explained above, it could lead to the propagation through the 
administrative process of a suboptimally tailored rule that lacks the 
support of a large constituency.
3. Break-Even Analysis Indicates that Providers Should 
Be Encouraged to Offer an Active Choice About Part 2 
Consent
Of course, performing the break-even analysis that was lacking 
from HHS’s revision of Part 2 is beyond the scope of this Article. This 
section’s focus is instead on the more narrow question of how family 
are deputized as able to receive and authorize disclosure of a person’s 
otherwise protected medical information. Break-even analysis of the 
first question—how family are deputized as able to receive a loved 
one’s protected information under Part 2—reveals that providers 
should be encouraged to present patients with an “active choice” 
about such deputization. Rather than make non-disclosure the 
assumed, default option, providers should affirmatively ask patients 
in each case whether they would like to identify one or more loved 
ones as able to obtain their health information.
As discussed above, HIPAA does not mandate a single default 
rule for permitting disclosure of protected medical information to 
patients’ friends or family. Instead, the current privacy rule leaves 
138 See Sunstein, supra note 91 (discussing such bias).
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it to doctors to use their judgment to decide whether to employ an 
opt-in or opt-out approach or, indeed, to decide whether to present 
the choice at all. This makes HIPAA’s privacy rule an example of a 
“tailored default”139 in which the determination of the default is left 
to the provider.
The choice architecture of Part 2 consent is in some sense a 
tailored default as well, except that doctors do not have the option 
of making consent “opt-out” when it comes to SUD information 
protected by Part 2 as they do when it comes to HIPAA. 140 Specifically, 
Part 2 requires a detailed, written consent form.141
The default rule for consent is important because default 
rules can be a powerful influence on decision-making; in organ 
donation, studies have shown the default determining a person’s 
choice approximately 16%–22% of the time.142 Defaults stick for 
several reasons: some individuals see defaults as communicating 
policymakers (or doctors’) judgment about the “best” option for 
them, and so take the default as a signal of the preferred approach.143 
Others follow the default due to the decisional burden of departing 
from it—not making a choice is easier than making a choice, 
especially when making the choice requires involved steps.144 And 
finally, due to the “endowment effect,” some value the default state 
of affairs more highly simply because it is the default.145 
This “status quo bias” can be avoided using an “active choice” 
approach in which decision-makers are forced to decide one way 
139 For an explanation of tailored defaults, see Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 1417, 
1420−27 (2014) (discussing advantages of personalized default rules).
140 See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 
Fla. St. L. Rev. 651 (2006).
141 42 C.F.R. § 2.31(a) (2018).
142 See Kendrick T. Van Dalen & Kène Henkens, Comparing the Effects of Defaults 
in Organ Donation Systems, 106 Soc. Sci. & Med. 137, 139 (2014) (reporting 
opt-in rate of 50% to organ donation as compared to 66% participation rate 
under active choice regime in survey-based study); Richard H. Thaler, Opting 
In vs. Opting Out, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2009, at BU6 (reporting 60% organ 
donation participation rate in Illinois under active choice regime, as compared 
to 38% rate nationally); Stan Dorn et al., Making Health Insurance Enrollment 
as Automatic as Possible (Part 1), Health Aff.: Health Aff. Blog (May 2, 
2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180501.141197/
full/. 





or the other, without a default option. An active choice approach 
avoids signaling one option as the “best one” and neutralizes the 
endowment effect, potential benefits bought at the “price” of forcing 
the decisional burden of making a choice on everyone.146 In short, 
active choice deprives people of the freedom not to decide, but frees 
their decision of the encumbrances of a perhaps undesired signal 
about the “best” option and the endowment effect.147
Is it right to leave providers on their own in deciding whether 
to make consent to Part 2 disclosure “opt-in” or instead to present 
patients with an “active choice” about such disclosure? 
Health: From the perspective of patient health, it is not clear 
that one or the other (opt-in or active choice) is preferable. The 
health concern underlying privacy protection for such information is 
that the threat of unwanted disclosures would deter someone from 
seeking treatment.148 But it is not apparent that asking a person 
affirmatively to decide whether to permit disclosure to a loved one or 
not would increase or decrease this threat. Indeed, Part 2 regulations 
require an early notice be given to patients regarding protections; 
inquiring about consent at the same time might helpfully underscore 
that the patient’s information is private if she wants it to be. In other 
words, concern that the threat of disclosure will discourage patients 
from seeking medical care in the first place is a reason not to disclose 
private information without the patient’s consent, not a reason to 
choose a default of non-disclosure over an active choice regime. In 
either case medical information is disclosed only with the patient’s 
consent. 
Interference: In contrast to health impacts, active choice has 
several potential social benefits over an opt-in regime. First, to the 
extent that people follow the status quo because they perceive it as a 
signal of the preferred alternative by policymakers,149 an opt-in regime 
146 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 39−43 
(2013) (discussing arguments in favor of active choosing). 
147 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword to Nudging Health, at xi (Glenn Cohen et 
al. eds., 2016). 
148 See Paul N. Samuels & Patty McCarthy Metcalf, Relaxing Patient Privacy 
Rules Would Worsen the Opioid Epidemic, Stat (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.
statnews.com/2017/11/24/opioid-epidemic-patient-privacy/ (arguing 
based on logic that Part 2 privacy protections significantly increase patients’ 
willingness to seek treatment such that relaxing such protections would cause 
“immeasurable and immediate” harm).
149 See John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Saving 
Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in Social Security Policy in a 
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signals that policymakers see going it alone as the best course. But 
research indicates that, quite the contrary, involving family in care 
is a positive.150 Accordingly, an opt-in approach may send the wrong 
signal and an active choice regime would be a preferable alternative 
because it would avoid sending any signal at all. 
Invisibility: Second, as to invisibility, an opt-in regime creates 
a significant risk that due to lack of awareness or inertia, a person 
whose loved ones are actively involved in her care will simply not 
go through the trouble of signing (or be unaware they can sign) a 
consent to permit her provider to disclose information to the loved 
one. Indeed, HHS encourages this common work-around.151 In such 
a case, the patient may simply communicate protected information 
to the loved one herself. While this is a lawful workaround and may 
be a functional one as well, it increases the likelihood that the role 
of family in assisting with a person’s treatment will go unobserved 
by policymakers or providers. 
Moreover, this invisible workaround for informing loved ones 
involved in a SUD patient’s care creates the risk of an additional 
adverse health impact of an opt-in regime. Even closely involved 
family may then be cut off from pivotal information if for any reason, 
such as a relapse, their loved one becomes unavailable to share 
information themselves. In such a case, the loved one who has been 
serving as a navigator and the provider themselves would be unable 
to collaborate, simply because they did not take the preemptive step 
of getting a consent on file when they had the chance due to an opt-
in regime. 
Inequality: Finally, inequality favors active choice because the 
effect of a default is not the same for all influenced by it.152 A well-
informed patient or family member with experience or competence 
Changing Environment 167 (Jeffery R. Brown et al. eds., 2009).
150 See supra Part II.A.
151 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052, 
6070 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“[I]t is permissible 
[under part 2] for a patient to disclose information to a personal health record 
or similar consumer application but if a part 2 program or lawful holder of 
patient identifying information discloses that information to the personal 
health record or similar consumer application on behalf of the patient, consent 
would be required.”).
152 See Jessica L. Roberts, Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice and the Ethics of Nudging, 
116 Mich. L. Rev. 1045, 1055 (2018) (“[N]udges do not work equally well 
for all citizens . . . .”); Lawrence, supra note 9, at 115−17 (discussing “status 
quo bias as a sifting mechanism” based on predictable variation among the 
population in the stickiness of defaults).
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navigating complicated health care regimes is relatively better able 
and more likely to learn of and find ways to overcome a default rule. 
In concrete terms, this means that a person’s ability to authorize 
a family member to discuss treatment options with his doctor 
depends on her cultural capital, educational, and competing decision 
burdens. So, the goal of equal treatment favors fewer burdens and 
active choice.
Weighing: As compared to an opt-in regime, active choice 
about disclosure of protected SUD treatment information to loved 
ones involved in a person’s care carries a reduced risk of interference 
with family relationships, makes care work more visible, reduces 
inequality inherent in an opt-in system, and has potential health 
benefits. It therefore appears to be the preferable way to present 
patients with the question of whether to consent to disclosure of 
their protected SUD information to loved ones.
Moreover, leaving providers with the unguided decision of 
whether and when to present an active choice about consent risks 
that they will not do so often enough. By training and by perspective, 
providers are positioned to focus on medical effects. This creates a 
risk that providers will tend to give too little weight to systemic, 
social consequences that are both beyond their expertise and beyond 
their immediate view. 
Accordingly, regulators should at a minimum consider 
issuing guidance encouraging providers to present patients with an 
active choice about disclosure to loved ones as a matter of course 
unless they perceive some concern that counsels against doing so. 
Such guidance might also suggest logistics for when and how to ask 
patients to make this choice. 
Moreover, it might be that any health benefits of allowing 
providers to decline to present patients with a choice about 
deputization are outweighed by the costs of this “tailored default” 
approach. This question should be explored further and, with it, the 
possibility of mandating rather than merely encouraging providers 
to present an active choice about consenting to disclosure of SUD 
information to loved ones in all cases.153 
153 Recently enacted federal legislation explicitly empowers family caregivers 
and requires that they be given support and resources. But this legislation 
was motivated by proponents of long-term care for the elderly, and so is 
triggered only upon a patient’s discharge from inpatient treatment at the 
hospital. H.B. 1329, 199th Gen. Assemb., 2015−16 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2016) 
(Caregiver Advise, Record, and Enable Act allows for a patient to choose their 
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4. Break-Even Analysis Indicates that Permitting
Supported Decision-Making for Part 2 Consent is a Difficult
Judgment Call
In addition to pointing to reforms that are desirable (or
undesirable), inclusion of social consequences in break-even analysis 
can promote understanding of laws that deputize family even where 
it does not ultimately counsel in favor a potential reform. The extent 
to which patients may deputize family to authorize disclosure of 
their Part 2-protected information is an example. 
A patient’s ability to permit a loved one to do more than 
receive protected information is very limited under both HIPAA and 
Part 2. If a patient wants to permit a loved one to authorize disclosures 
to third parties, she must give that loved one the power to make 
health care decisions for her through at least a power of attorney or, 
in the case of Part 2, formal guardianship. 154 No in-between option is 
available whereby a loved one can be acknowledged and empowered 
as a care partner, both receiving information and authorizing further 
caregiver following discharge from a hospital, upon signed consent; hospitals 
are obligated to provide all instructions to care to the caregiver in question); 
Recognize, Assist, Include, Support and Engage Family Caregivers Act of 
2017, Pub. L. No. 115−119, 132 Stat. 23 (2018) (establishing benefits for 
home health caretakers who assist their family members outside of a hospital 
setting” including a new position that coordinates with several agencies to 
devise a specific plan to ensure the education and development of positive 
outlooks for family caregivers); Mindy Fetterman, Family Caregivers Finally 
Get a Break — and Some Coaching, NPR: Shots (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/04/27/606054065/family-
caregivers-finally-get-a-break-and-some-coaching. The same considerations 
that justify mandating attention to family caregivers in that context—at the 
time of discharge, case-specific medical considerations may become relatively 
less weighty and systemic questions about how entities beyond the provider 
will care for the patient going forward become more weighty—may justify 
requiring providers to inquire whether SUD patients would like to authorize 
disclosures to their own care-givers, if any, and the provision of institutional 
and educational resources to such caregivers, at the time of discharge from 
inpatient or outpatient SUD treatment. 
154 See Office for Civil Rights Headquarters, supra note 119 (“State or other law 
should be consulted to determine the authority of the personal representative 
to receive or access the individual’s protected health information.”); cf. Daniel 
L. Walbright, Recent OCR Action Provides HIPAA Guidance Related to Opioid
Crisis and Privacy Rule in Research, Nat’l L. Rev. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.
natlawreview.com/article/recent-ocr-action-provides-hipaa-guidance-related-
to-opioid-crisis-and-privacy-rule (describing recent HHS OCR release of tools
designed to assist patients and family members in situations of opioid abuse
and overdose and mental health crises).
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disclosures to additional providers or care workers. 
Supported decision-making is an alternative approach that has 
been gaining ground in other contexts. It is a rights-based alternative 
to guardianship in the disability and elder law fields.155 Supported 
decision-making provides “legal recognition to relationships of 
trust” by empowering a person’s “advocate” to discuss her health 
care and other options with providers and otherwise participate in 
the care decision-making process.156 The key insight of supported 
decision-making is to create an interim legal recognition, short 
of power of attorney or other forms of actual decision-making 
control, for advocates who participate in a person’s health care.157 
A number of states have passed legislation explicitly empowering 
patients to acknowledge supported decisionmakers, ensuring that 
such supporters be given enhanced participation in their loved ones’ 
medical decision-making.158
Such an in-between approach, in which patients could 
empower their loved ones to participate in their care, including 
receiving, sharing, and authorizing the disclosure of protected 
health information, without giving their loved ones the power to 
make health care decisions for them, holds promise for SUD. That 
said, break-even analysis indicates that such a reform may not be 
desirable and points to open questions that must be explored (or 
about which informed judgments must be made) to decide that 
question. 
Health: From the perspective of patient health, supported 
decision-making in SUD carries potential benefits and costs. One 
benefit would be that such an approach would mitigate the difficulties 
currently posed by care coordination in SUD; loved ones empowered 
to authorize disclosures could help a diverse network of providers, 
social workers, and others involved collaborate on a patient’s care. 
On the other hand, empowering a third party to authorize 
disclosures on a patient’s behalf creates an inevitable risk that such 
155 See generally Rebekah Diller, Legal Capacity for All: Including Older Persons in the 
Shift from Adult Guardianship to Supported Decision-making, 43 Fordham Urb. 
L.J. 495 (2016).
156 Id. at 512, 516. 
157 See id. at 514 (describing an interim legal recognition that uses the “best 
interpretation of will and preferences” when making substituted decisions 
on behalf of a person whose will and preferences cannot otherwise be 
ascertained). 
158 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 16 §9401A (2018) (“This chapter may be cited as 
the ‘Supported Decision-Making Act.’”).
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disclosure will be undesired by the patient, and so of chilling the 
patient from sharing information in the first place. As avoiding such 
a chill is a purpose of Part 2, such a potential cost should be given 
substantial weight. 
Interference: The current all-or-nothing approach to 
empowering third parties under Part 2 has clear downsides from 
the perspective of interference. Some patients may feel compelled 
to grant a loved one who is closely involved in their care power of 
attorney to facilitate that involvement. On the other hand, other 
patients may be forced to navigate aspects of treatment themselves 
despite their desire to involve family because they are unwilling 
to go so far as to give their loved one power of attorney (or enter 
guardianship). In such a case, the current approach isolates patients 
even when they have access to family supports who they would like 
to make more involved.
Equality: Finally, it is possible that the current approach has 
equality benefits in this limited sense: by effectively forbidding some 
forms of care work, the current approach ensures that the burdens of 
such work are equally distributed. 
Implementing some form of supported decision-making 
for personal information protected by Part 2 would carry potential 
benefits: it could facilitate collaboration between providers and 
others involved in a person’s treatment while both recognizing and 
encouraging the close participation of loved ones in the treatment 
of patients who want such support. On the other hand, such a 
reform poses some risk of unwanted disclosures, and the burdens of 
supported decision-making might not be unfairly distributed. 
Having identified these tradeoffs, the next step in break-even 
analysis is to construct upper or lower bounds for both (or either) the 
uncertain costs and benefits of supported decision-making for SUD. 
Effect on fatal overdose rates is a logical starting point for setting 
these bounds. SUD sufferers enrolled in evidence-based treatment 
have an all-cause mortality rate that is about 1/3 of those who are 
not.159 So, it is fair to say that for each person who is chilled from 
treatment, there will be 24.8 additional deaths per 1000 life years.160 
159 See Sordo et al., supra note 16, at 4 (noting a mortality rate of 11.3 per 1000 
person years for SUD sufferers in methadone treatment and 36.1 per 1000 
person years for SUD sufferers not in methadone treatment).
160 This number subtracts the ineffective-treatment mortality rate from the out-
of-treatment rate from the prior footnote; 36.1-11.3=24.8, see Sordo et al., 
supra note 16, at 4.
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On the other hand, meta-analysis of studies exploring the relationship 
between social relationships and health generally reveals a non-
disease-specific 50% increased risk of survival associated with such 
relationships, and studies on the SUD impacts of such relationships 
are consistent with this finding.161 Based on this, we can estimate 
a reasonable upper bound for the impact of family involvement in 
SUD may be ~5.65 fewer deaths per 1000 life years.162 If we attribute 
supported decision-making as capturing 10% of this by facilitating 
more family involvement and coordination among providers, then 
supported decision-making would mean .0565 (or .057) fewer fatal 
overdoses per extra supported decision-making arrangement. 
Setting bounds in this way reveals the following tradeoff: in 
order to be worthwhile from the perspective of health, approximately 
44 individuals would have to make use of supported decision-making 
for every 1 individual who was deterred from seeking treatment due 
to supported decision-making.163 This tradeoff makes it difficult to 
say whether such a reform would be worthwhile or not from the 
perspective of health; if the ratio were 1000:1 it might be easy to 
say that supported decision-making is unlikely to be worth it, and if 
the ratio were 1:1 it would be easy to say that it is. Thus, breakeven 
analysis reveals that to be justified based on medical benefit alone a 
reform applicable to patients who are in treatment must be strong 
indeed if it comes with any increased risk of chilling patients from 
seeking treatment in the first place, because the risk of chill applies 
to all patients and the cost of such chill is very high.
Furthermore, this analysis reveals where additional 
information or tough judgments are needed to decide about the 
desirability of supported decision-making in SUD care. In the final 
analysis, the desirability of supported decision-making in the SUD 
context depends crucially on whether and to what degree such a 
reform could lead to more patients being chilled from seeking 
treatment for fear of unauthorized disclosures. This depends, in 
turn, crucially on the mechanism by which some SUD sufferers’ 
fear of disclosure should they seek treatment comes to be. If this 
fear is in some sense rational—based on the actual likelihood of 
161 See Holt-Lunstad et al., supra note 5 (reporting 50% increased likelihood of 
survival for those with stronger social relationships); supra note 50 (discussing 
SUD-specific evidence).
162 This number multiplies the in-treatment mortality rate by .5; 11.3 * .5 = 5.65.
163 This number reflects the ratio of the bound for the potential health harm 
(24.8) to the bound for the potential health benefit (.57); 24.8/.57 = 43.5.
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disclosure—then supported decision-making poses little risk of 
chill. A SUD patient concerned about unauthorized disclosure 
by her supported decisionmaker would have an option to avoid 
such disclosure short of avoiding treatment altogether: she could 
simply decline to empower such a decisionmaker (or revoke the 
deputization). On the other hand, if the fear that chills patients 
from seeking treatment—and that Part 2 is designed to mitigate—is 
based purely on anecdotal stories of unwanted disclosures, then the 
possibility of such disclosures resulting from a supported decision-
making regime alone would give cause for concern. Further research 
might helpfully explore this mechanism, and in the interim this is a 
key question on which policymakers considering such a reform must 
make a judgment.
5. Patient Deputies
The two preceding suggestions—active choice about patient 
consent to disclosure of SUD information coupled with a new 
option for patients to empower someone short of a guardian to 
obtain and authorize disclosure of their medical information—could 
be coupled at the state or federal level with a systematic “patient 
deputy” program. A state or federal database (perhaps building on 
prescription drug monitoring program infrastructure) could permit 
patients to appoint a “patient deputy” who would presumptively be 
empowered to obtain and share their health care information. Such 
an approach would carry the potential benefits and potential costs 
of the two separate choice architecture changes discussed above. 
Publicity and centralization associated with such a program would 
carry several additional positive implications.
From the standpoint of health, regulators could use 
registration as a health care deputy as an opportunity to provide 
educational materials tailored to help loved ones do their care work 
more effectively. At the same time, such a program would be a 
conduit through which to take steps to protect the health of such 
care takers, who too often suffer their own health or financial issues 
from their focus on their loved ones’ needs.164 
From the standpoint of interference, state recognition of the 
paramount but in some sense emergent, non-traditional role that 
loved ones other than spouses play in many patients’ lives would 
both encourage and provide recognition and validation to such 
164 See Grunfeld et al., supra note 66.
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relationships.165 The state could use its expressive power to endorse 
the role that so many already take on, thereby potentially facilitating 
the formation of additional such relationships. 
From the standpoint of invisibility, a centralized patient 
deputy program would permit state regulators to begin to develop a 
better-informed understanding of the extent of care work performed 
by loved ones. Moreover, with this understanding in hand, regulators 
could begin to address such work and relationships in social 
programs that currently ignore them. For example, the Family and 
Medical Leave Act currently excludes siblings from its protections; 
a person is not entitled to protected time off to care for a sibling. 
A patient deputy program would provide a ready basis on which to 
expand these protections to all care takers, recognizing the evolving 
nature of caring relationships today.166
Lastly, from the standpoint of inequality, a patient deputies 
program would permit regulators to better track the benefits and 
burdens of care work. Given a current scarcity of resources, it may 
be too much to imagine that patient deputies would be properly 
compensated for their labors, but observing labors that are currently 
going un-recognized would be a first step. Moreover, as to burdens, 
if such tracking revealed that that those able to make use of the 
patient deputies program reflected an uneven sample of the overall 
patient population, then regulators should explore directing available 
resources—such as funding for navigator programs—to counteract 
the imbalance in hopes of a more just health care system. 
V. Conclusion: Deputizing Family in SUD and Beyond
While the health impacts of any legal intervention may be 
165 Compare U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (endorsing 
inclusive understanding of family in case involving participation of “‘hippies’ 
and ‘hippie communes’” in food stamp program), with Melissa Murray, The 
Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 
94 Va. L. Rev. 386, 398−99 (“The law effectively has constructed a 
parent/stranger dichotomy in which one is either a parent . . . or one is a 
legal stranger . . . .”).
166 Cf. Murray, supra note 165, at 388 (“By characterizing caregiving as the exclusive 
province of parents, the law overlooks the considerable efforts of caregivers 
who are not parents”); see id. (“[I]n order to better support caregiving as it 
is practiced, I call for a broader legal understanding of caregiving that would 
acknowledge a wider range of caregiving efforts . . . .”); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian 
Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 569, 576–84.
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paramount, when assessing the desirability of an intervention that 
makes foreseeable use of loved ones such as family it is important 
to consider the possibility that the health reform has adverse social 
consequences. Even the mere possibility of such consequences may 
turn the balance against adoption of a reform with questionable 
health impacts. 
Consideration of the social consequences of deputization in 
the prevention and teatment of SUD—in particular, of interference, 
invisibility, and inequality posed by laws that deputize family in 
this context—counsels in favor of greater choice regarding such 
deputization. The desirability of some changes, such as supported 
decision-making or a patient deputy program, may be a matter 
of judgment, but providers, insurers, and regulators should at 
least favor an “active choice” approach when it comes to patients’ 
decisions to deputize their own family members in their care.  In 
health care and especially in the treatment of SUD, isolation should 
not be the default.  
There are also lessons that extend beyond SUD and beyond 
healthcare. The “deputization” framework this Article has employed 
offers a way of thinking about the burdens of care work generally 
that makes such work more visible and more readily understood. 
Scholars in family law have lamented that the public/private 
narrative generally applied to care work—in which such work takes 
place in the “private” sphere, as distinct from the “public” world 
of regulation and government—facilitates the invisibility of care 
work.167 Understanding all laws that foreseeably rely on care work 
in addressing a regulatory problem as “deputizing family”—and so 
understanding loved ones as analogous to social workers, doctors, 
bureaucrats, or other regulatory tools rather than as sui generis, 
independent, and invisible providers of care—breaks down this 
public/private distinction. 
This narrative shift may not be without cost—“deputization” 
entails someone doing the deputizing, implying that the work is on 
some level done for another. When deputization comes from the 
state, “collapsing” the public and private actually means the public 
absorbing the private. That understanding could interfere with family 
relationships in unexpected and presumably (though perhaps not 
167 Murray, supra note 165, at 436 (“Emphasizing the private character of 
caregiving, they argued, absolved the state of any responsibility to assist 
families in providing care, and, critically, contributed to the devaluation of 
caregiving and caregivers.”).
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necessarily) undesirable ways. On the other hand, when deputization 
comes through the patient—when a law permits a patient to 
empower a loved one vis a vis disease or third parties—this risk 
is not present. Relatedly, the examples and analyses in this Article 
have revealed a similar tendency that separates laws that empower 
a loved one vis a vis the patient and laws that permit the patient to 
empower a loved one vis a vis third parties.  Patient-disempowering 
deputizations have tended to pose a risk of negative interference 
with family relationships, while patient-empowering deputizations 
have tended to raise the possibility of positive interference. That 
dynamic is not unique to healthcare, so further research might 
explore whether the character of deputization is as determinative of 
its desirability in other contexts. 
